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ABSTRACT 
THE ORGINAL TURKISH CONCERNS ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS  
IN NORTNERN IRAQ 
 
Choi, Kwangsoo 
 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu 
 
May 2008 
 
After the invasion of Iraq by the U.S., Iraq is undergoing significant 
transition that no one can predict the future perfectly. Such changes in Iraq will lead 
to the increasing concerns from neighboring countries including Turkey, Iran, and 
Arab states. Especially, there are historical, demographical, political and geo-
strategic contexts of Turkey‟s longstanding interests in the developments taking 
place in Iraq; treaties between Turkey and British related to Mosul that goes back to 
the 1920s, close cultural ties with Turkmen or Iraqi Turk who has lived in mostly 
northern Iraq, the direct threat of PKK who has stationed in northern Iraq to Turkey 
and an increased instability of security structure in Middle East. This thesis aims to 
elaborate the original Turkish concerns of developments in northern Iraq with 
political, demographical, political and geo-strategic dimensions by taking facts into 
considerations. Also, in accordance with the assessment of Turkish foreign policy 
about northern Iraq in particular since 1990s, it attempts to understand Turkish 
policies about northern Iraq.  
Keywords: Mosul, Mudros Armistice, National Pact, Lausanne Treaty, Ankara 
Agreement, Turkmen, Arabization, Kurdification, PKK, No-Fly-Zone. 
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Ö ZET 
Kuzey Irak‟taki Gelişmeler Üzerine Türkiye‟nin Asıl Kaygıları 
 
Choi, Kwangsoo 
 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu 
 
Mayıs 2008 
 
 ABD tarafından işgal edildikten sonra Irak, hiç kimsenin geleceği tam 
anlamıyla tahmin edemeyeceği bir değişim sürecine girdi. Irak‟taki bu değişim 
Türkiye, İran ve Arap ülkeleri gibi komşu ülkelerin güvenlik konusundaki 
endişelerinin artmasına yol açtı. Irakt‟aki gelişmeler özellikle tarihsel, demografık, 
siyasal ve jeostratejik açıdan Türkiye‟yi kaygılandırmaktadır. Bu kaygılar Türkiye 
ve İngiltere arasında tarihi 1920‟lere dayanan Musul ile ilgili anlaşmalar, Kuzey 
Irak‟ta yaşayan Türkmenlerle arasındaki yakın kültürel bağlar, Kuzey Irak‟ta 
yerleşmiş olan PKK‟nın sebep olduğu güvenlik tehdidi ve Ortadoğu‟da yükselmekte 
olan güvenlik sorunlarıyla yakından ilgilidir. Bu tezde olaylar göz önünde tutularak, 
Türkiye‟nin Kuzey Irak meselesi üzerindeki gerçek kaygıları tarihsel, demografık, 
siyasal ve jeostratejik açıdan incelenmeye çalışılmıştır. Öte yandan, Türkiye‟nin 
1990 yılından bu yana sürdürdüğü Kuzey Irak politikasının değerlendirilmesine 
paralel olarak, Türkiye‟nin Kuzey Irak politikalarını anlamaya çalışmaktadır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Musul, Mondros Mütarekesi, Misak-ı Milli, Lozan Antlaşması, 
Ankara Anlaşması, Türkmenler, Araplaştırma, Kürtleştirme, PKK, Uçuşa-Yaşak- 
Bölge. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
After the creation of the No-fly-Zone,
1
 the de facto autonomous Kurdish area 
in northern Iraq has emerged as one of the most important and urgent security 
challenges from Turkey. More importantly, the deeply increasing sectarian conflicts 
among Sunni, Shiite and Kurds as well as insurgencies have threatened the fragile 
federal Iraqi government who had the support of Sunni and Kurds, not Shiite in 
terms of political, social and territorial unitary. It goes without saying that the fragile 
Iraqi situation has led various security challenges to the neighboring countries 
including Turkey, Iran and Syria. Especially, considering the close ties with northern 
Iraq in various perspectives, the developments of Iraq are deeply connected with the 
security problems of Turkey. 
   This thesis aims to elaborate the original Turkish concerns of developments 
in northern Iraq with the historical, demographical, political and geo-strategic 
contexts by taking facts into considerations. The other objective of this thesis is to 
                                                 
1
 The creation of the so-called “no-fly-zones” by the United States and Britain, without referring 
specifically to any United Nations Resolution, which denied the Iraqi military entering the large 
segments of the Iraqi territory both in the north and in the south, caused much political concern as 
well as serious security problems for Turkey in many respects. 
 2 
evaluate Turkish policies about northern Iraq by sampling out the most important 
decisions of Turkey about northern Iraq since 1990s. 
  This thesis is significantly different from existing studies on a ground that it 
focuses on the multi-dimensional aspects rather than the one-dimensional ones. In 
other words, it is very unique in a sense that it provides the reader with four 
perspectives of Turkish concerns; the historical, demographical, political and geo-
strategic perspectives. Also, the reasons why Turkey cannot help concerning about 
the developments of northern Iraq are speculated with the evaluation from past to 
current events.  
In the first Chapter, British occupation of Mosul (in the violation of the 
Mudros Armistice) and the inclusion of Mosul into the Turkish National Pact 
would be the starting-point of Turkish historical concern for northern Iraq. The 
contrasted arguments between Turkey and British about the Mosul on the Lausanne 
Conference was inclined toward British favor by the virtue of the power politics, 
being accepted the British arguments one-sidedly. The historical approach shows 
the fact that not only would the arguments of Turkey who was not even a member 
of the League of Nations (LoN) at that time when the Mosul issue was decided by 
the LoN not be accepted in the resolutions by the LoN but also even the ratified 
Ankara agreement that decided the final status of Mosul issue would not be 
observed.
 2
 According to Hasan Tunç, “pursuant to the Ankara Agreement, Turkey 
conceded the Mosul to the Iraqi government under the mandate of British, not to 
the particular ethnic groups. If the Ankara Agreement will remain invalid, the right 
to Mosul shall be returned to Turkey by the guidance of international law.”3  
                                                 
2
 Turkey joined into the LoN in 1932 whereas the resolution of LoN about the Mosul issue was 
decided in December 1925.  
3
 Hasan Tunç, “Tarihten Bugüne Kerkük ve Geleceği(Kirkuk and its future from the history to now),” 
Global Strateji, Vol. 9, Spring 2007, p.22. 
 3 
  In the second Chapter, Turkmen who has the close ethnic ties with Turkey 
would be analyzed as the demographical factor that causes to Turkish concern. 
After the concession of Mosul from Turkey to Iraq, Iraqi governments had tried to 
transform the northern Iraq from the Turkmen land to Arabian one. As illustrative 
examples, the massacres against Turkmen in 1924, 1946, 1959 and 1991 under the 
support or silent tolerance of Iraqi governments were the policy of ethnic 
assimilation in order to make northern Iraq to Arabian land. On the other hand, 
after the operation of No-Fly-Zone, Kurds supported by the U.S. have carried out 
the Kurdification of northern Iraq by changing the existing demographical structure 
favoring their own interests in order to create the Kurdistan state. Furthermore, 
original Turkmen land, Kirkuk where reserves a lot of natural resource, particularly 
oil, has been extensive Kurdification process by Kurdish groups for the purpose of 
including Kirkuk as the zone of Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). 
In the third Chapter, Turkish security concern about the Kurdistan Workers 
Party (Partiye Karkaren Kurdistane, PKK), terrorist group, stationed in Northern 
Iraq will be addressed. Even though it is true that the PKK responsible for over 
37,000 casualties (approximately 27,000 PKK terrorists, 5,000 Turkish security 
forces and 5,000 civilians) has stationed in northern Iraq since 1982 firstly, after the 
operation of No-Fly-Zone, it has used northern Iraq as the breeding ground under 
the help of the Iraqi Kurdish groups. More importantly, under such a situation, the 
de facto Iraqi Kurdish region in northern Iraq would be likely to be a center to 
attract the Kurds living in Turkey.  
Another problem is the difficulty for cross border operations by Turkish 
military to eliminate the PKK terrorists in northern Iraq without the cooperation of 
other political actors such as the U.S., Iraq and KRG. Therefore, Turkey also should 
 4 
try to find out the ways to persuade other political actors to share Turkish concerns 
about the PKK.  
In short, it would not be surprised that Turkey has responded to the current 
developments of northern Iraqi situation sensitively if we take consideration into the 
historical, geographical and cultural links of the PKK to Kurdish politicians in 
northern Iraq.  
In the fourth Chapter, taking into a consideration the fact that Turkey is 
simultaneously located not only in the part of the Middle Eastern regional political 
system but also in the part of the Europe, the undergoing instability of Iraq, 
especially the emergence of a de facto autonomous Kurds area, would exacerbate the 
unstable security structure of Middle East to the actual bloody conflicts in the region. 
Even though neighboring countries including Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey and Iran 
have a subtle difference in seeking to their own national interests in Iraq, all Middle 
Eastern states have argued that the unitary of Iraq should be maintained in terms of 
political and territorial aspect. On the contrary to all Middle Eastern states, both the 
U.S. and Israel who do not have any alliance in the Middle East exception to Turkey 
have increased the regional instability by giving supports to the Kurdish groups. 
Also, the policies of Great Powers including the U.S., Russia, European Union (EU) 
and China about Iraq have been so contrary to each other that the instability of Iraq 
can be expanded to the entire Middle East.  
  In the conclusion, after summarizing the original Turkish concerns about 
northern Iraq, this thesis will analyze the Turkish foreign policies about northern 
Iraq by sampling out the most important Turkish decisions (the participation of the 
No-Fly-Zone operation and the Turkish refusal of American request to deploy U.S. 
army in Turkish territory) and Turkish policy about Turkmen since 1990s.  
 5 
The methodology used in this thesis is descriptive one based on the 
secondary sources mostly in Turkish and English books or articles, TV programs 
and newspapers. In particular, the data of the second Chapter that will explain the 
situation of Turkmen come from the Turkish books in that the close attractiveness 
of Turkish scholars to the Iraqi Turkmen in various aspects may lead to study 
rather than foreign ones.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
THE MOSUL QUESTION IN THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Even though there were many Turkish states such as the “Seljuks of Iraq, the 
Zengids, the Atabeylik of Erbil, Karakoyunlu and Akkoyunlu States in the Mosul-
Kirkuk region,”4 the direct relationship between Turkey and Mosul dated back to 
1517 year when the Ottoman Empire conquered the Mosul and Kirkuk.
5
 That is, the 
historical concern, Mosul issue originated from the defeat of Ottoman Empire in 
World War One. The Mosul Vilayeti in the past comprising Kirkuk, Mosul, Erbil and 
Suleymaniyah has been written as the Mosul issue in the various documents due to 
the territorial dispute between Turkey, the successor of Ottoman Empire and British, 
the winner of World War One. Mosul issue was one of the most difficult diplomatic 
problems both states could not solve during a short negotiation time because of the 
sharp conflict of opinions on this issue. By analyzing various treaties from the 
Mudros Armistice to the Ankara Agreement between Turkey and British, we can find 
why Turkey has a concern about developments of Iraq with the respect of the 
                                                 
4
 Ekrem Pamukçu and Habib Hürmüzlü, Irak‟ta Türkmen Boy ve Oymaklar(Turkmen Clans and 
Nomadic Tribes in Iraq), (Ankara: Global Strateji Enstitüsü, 2005), pp.7-14. 
5
 Henry A. Foster. The Making of Modern Iraq, (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1935), 
p.24. 
 7 
historical perspective. The violation of the Mudros Armistice by British deprived the 
Turkish right to Mosul. And, the Ankara Agreement, the final agreement about status 
of Mosul provided Turkey with the legal right to Mosul if Iraq who ratified the 
Ankara Agreement will be dissolved.  
 
2.2 The Mosul before Lausanne Treaty 
During the First World War, there were many secret agreements signed 
among the Entente Powers which could determine the result of Eastern Question,
6
 
which were the Istanbul Agreement,
7
 the London Agreement,
8
 the Sykes-Picot (-
Sazonov) Agreement
9
 and the Saint Jeanne de Maurienne Agreement.
10
 However, 
these agreements should be changed by the withdrawal of Russia from World War I, 
the inclusion of the U.S. and the change of interest calculation of Great Powers. Even 
though all these agreements included the Mosul issue, the direct causal relationship 
of current Mosul issue was based on the Mudros armistice signed on October 30, 
1918.  
                                                 
6
 The Eastern Question which is normally dated to 1774, when the Russo-Turkish War, 1768-1774, 
ended in defeat for the Ottoman Empire, encompasses the diplomatic and political problems posed by 
the decay of the Ottoman Empire.  
7
 The Istanbul Agreement signed on March 18, 1915 between Russia, Britain and France recognized 
that Russia possessed Istanbul, the Straits, the European shores of Dardanelles and the Sea of 
Marmara in the event of an Entente Victory. For detailed information, see Salahi R. Sonyel, op cit., 
pp.1-2. 
8
 In the London Agreement of April 26, 1915 between Britain, France, Russia and Italy, Italy gained 
the right to share the partition of Ottoman Empire in return for its participation in the war on the side 
of Entente Powers. According to this agreement, Italy was promised an „equitable‟ share of the 
Mediterranean region adjacent to the Province of Adalia. For detailed information, see Salahi R. 
Sonyel, op cit., pp.1-2. 
9
 The Sykes-Picot agreement signed in May 1916 between British and France just while World War 
One continued. According to this agreement, northern Iraq was left to French authority. However, in 
the San Remo Conference on April 24, 1920, France waived its claims on Mosul in return for 
receiving 25% of share of Mosul oil revenues and Britain‟s evacuation of Syria. For detailed 
information, see Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, Türk-İngiliz İlişkileri(The Relations between Turkey and British), 
(Ankara: Ü niversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1978), p.42. 
10
 When Italy learned about the Sykes-Picot Agreement, it demanded its share from this agreement. 
The Saint-Jeanne de Maurienne Agreement signed on April 17, 1917 between Britain, France and 
Italy replaced the London Agreement. According to this agreement, Italy recognized the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement and in return the regions of Antalya, Konya, Aydın and Izmir were left to Italy. Russia was 
not albe to join this agreement due to the Bolshevik revolution with the declaration that the 
international contracts of the Czarist adminstration never came into effect.  
 8 
2.2.1 The Mudros Armistice 
After the withdrawal of Germany from the war, the Ottoman Empire who 
lacked the sufficient war materials including human and industrial resources could 
not help suggesting the armistice to the Allied Powers. Even though the armistice 
negotiations would place the emphasis on interests of victorious nations regardless of 
the defeated ones, as the word stands, the victorious nations could gain the 
advantages by inserting the ambiguous clauses in the Mudros Armistice Treaty,
11
 in 
particular, in the 7th articles. In the 7th article, Allied Powers could acquire the right 
to occupy the strategic locations of Ottoman Empire in an increasing situation where 
their security could be threatened.
12
 Just after the Mudros Armistice became 
operative on October 31, 1918, the Allied Powers started to occupy the strategic 
locations of Ottoman Empire like the Straits, Mosul and so on. 
Admittedly, the occupation of Mosul can be estimated by one of British 
policies in order to protect their strategic goals. The Mosul, a large extent, the Iraq 
gave the strategic importance to British from the two points. First of all, statements 
of German experts in 1871
13
 that there were rich oil reserves in Mosul region 
increased foreign attention towards the region but at that time the use of oil was 
limited and the transportation of it was problematic. However, since that time, the oil 
in Mosul was the crucial for British in the areas of industry and war. The focus of 
great powers on the oil was expressed in the words the British Prime Minister 
Churchill said during the First World War, “one drop of oil is as important as one 
                                                 
11
 See Appendix A for the full text of the Mudros Armistice. 
12
 Salahi R. Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy(1918-1923): Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National 
Movement, (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 1975), p.3. 
13
 Suphi Saatçı, “Irak Türkmenleri ve Kerkük Sorunu (Iraqi Turkmen and Kirkuk Question),” Global 
Strateji, Vol. 9, Spring 2007, p.25. 
 9 
drop of blood of our soldiers.”14 Secondly, in order to maintain the stable control of 
India, the routes to India should be safeguarded.
15
 Thus, British sought to foreign 
policies which Iran and Iraq were under the control of their own hands. Such 
intentions of British were presented in various historical events such as the postpone 
of signing of the Armistice Treaty, the obligation of the Mudros Armistice by the 
occupation of the Mosul and military threat to the Turkish army who stationed in the 
Mosul legitimately. The 25
th
 Article of Mudros Armistice regulated as follows; 
“Hostilities between the Allies and Turkey shall cease from noon, local time, on 
Thursday, 31
st
 October, 1918.”16 In other words, despite of the fact that all forces 
should be stopped at that time when the armistice came into the effect on October 21, 
1918, at noon local time, the British forces occupied Hammalil on November 1 and 
demanded the unconditional withdrawal of the Turkish forces from Mosul to the 
north and the surrender of Turkish garrison on the next day. Considering the fact that 
on October 30, 1918 when the armistice was signed, the 6th Ottoman Army 
commanded by Ali Ihsan Pasha occupied the entire areas of Mosul involving Rakka, 
Miyadin, Telafar, Dibeke, Cemcemal, Suleymaniyah except Kirkuk,
17
 the move to 
Mosul of British army and demand to withdrawal of Turkish army from Mosul were 
violations of the Mudros Armistice.  That is, the starting-point that Mosul issue was 
                                                 
14
 Zekeriya Türkmen, “Musul Meselesi Askeri Yönden Çözüm Arayışlar(The Military Attempts to 
solve the Mosul Question),” Global Strateji, Vol. 9, Spring 2007, p.14; Mehmet Kocaoğlu, 
Uluslararası İlişkiler Işığında Ortadoğu Paraçalanmak İstenen Topraklar ve İstismare Edilen 
İnsanlar(People who want to disseminate the Middle East in the international relation), (Ankara: 
Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1995),  pp.175-176. 
15
 Zekeriya Türkmen, “Birinci Dünya Savaşından Kurtuluş Savaşı‟na Uzunan Süreçte Musul 
Meselesine Bakış: Mustafa Kemal Paşa‟nın Musul Konusundaki Duyarlılığı ve Misak-I Millide Musul 
(The View of Mosul from the First World War to the Independent War: The Warning of Mustafa 
Kemal and the Mosul under the National Pact),” Global Strateji, Vol. 9, Spring 2007, p.108. 
16
 Gwynne Cyer, “The Turkish Armistice of 1918 :  A Lost Opportunity : The Armistice Negotiations 
of Mudros, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 8, No : 2, 1972. For the full text of Mudros Armistice, see 
Appendix A. 
17
Semih E. Yalçın, Misak I Milli ve Lozan Konferansı Belgeleri‟nde Musul Sorunu(The Mosul 
Problme in the Documents of Lausanne Confereance and National pact), in Misak-ı Milli ve Türk Dış 
Politikasında Musul, Kerkük ve Arbil Meselerleri Sempozyumu(Symposium about Mosul, Kirkuk and 
Erbil in the Turkish Foreign Policy), (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk 
Araştırmaları Merkezi Yayınları, 1998), p.157. 
 10 
decided in favor of Britain later rooted in the violation of the Mudros Armistice 
directly by the illegitimate force.  
 
 2.2.2 The National Pact and Sevres Agreement 
 By the end of the First World War, the Mudros Armistice, which ended the 
war between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers, was the final stage of this 
process and the Treaty of Sevres which disintegrated the entire territory of Ottoman 
Empire except only the inner Anatolia. Yet, the National Liberation Movement led 
by Mustafa Kemal rejected the proposed peace terms and established its own 
government in Ankara on a basis of the National Pact. Elections held in the post-
Armistice Ottoman Empire for a new Turkish Chamber of Deputies ended with the 
overwhelming victory of the Turkish nationalists who were in the line with a 
Kemalist declaration of political principle known as the National Pact. The basic 
aims of the National Pact were to create the independent nation-state based on the 
social, cultural and religious element, not the ethnic one and to encourage both Turks 
and Kurds who were under the rule of Allied Powers to call for resistance to the 
partition of Turkish homeland. With the announcement of Mustafa Kemal elected as 
the first president about the establishment of Turkish Parliament (The Grand 
National Assembly, GNA) in Ankara on April 23, 1920, the GNA accepted the 
National Pact as the basic principles of their all policies. The first article of the 
National Pact related to the Mosul was written as follows; 
The destiny of the portions of Ottoman territory under foreign occupation and 
people by an Arab majority at the time of the signing of the armistice on 
October 30, 1918 should be determined by a plebiscite of all inhabitants. All 
such territories inhabited by an Ottoman Muslim majority, united in religion, 
in race, and in aspiration, are imbued with feelings of mutual respect, concern, 
and devotion, and form an indivisible whole.
18
  
                                                 
18
 Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp.348-349. 
 11 
According to this article, the Ottoman territories where were not under the 
occupation of Allied Powers at the time of the Mudros armistice of October 30, 1918 
should be transferred to Turkey, the successor state of Ottoman Empire. The Mosul 
also where British occupied one week after the Mudros armistice became operative 
by violating it should be remained within the Turkish territory in accordance with the 
National Pact. Mustafa Kemal presented the fact that Mosul should remain inside 
Turkey as follows; 
On the day the armistice was signed, the country comprised within these 
limits was practically under the control of our armies. The line delimiting this 
boundary starts from a point south of the Gulf of Alexandretta and goes 
toward Antioch, passing between Aleppo and the Katime Station and it meets 
the Euphrates at a point south of the Jerablus Brides. Then it goes through 
Der Zor and turns eastward to include Kirkuk, Mosul and Suleymaniyah 
within or dominion. Besides the fact that the regions within this boundary 
were defended militarily, they were inhabited by Turks and Kurds, while the 
southern part of this limit is inhabited by our Arabic-speaking co-religionists. 
So the country included within this boundary has been adopted as the 
inseparable home of the Ottomans.
19
 
 
 On the other hand, the Sevres Agreement, which aimed to disintegrate the 
Ottoman Empire, was signed on August 10, 1920 by the Istanbul government. 
According to the Treaty of Sevres, the Arab provinces disseminated from the 
Ottoman Empire as decided at San Remo; Greece acquired Western and Eastern 
Thrace including Edirne and Aegean Islands; Izmir also would be under the Greece 
administration for five years and then it could be incorporated to Greece if the 
majority of people wished so after five years; Italy gained the Dodecanese including 
Rhodes; Armenia would be independent state and the current northern Iraq including 
Mosul was given autonomy and the Kurds would be independent if they wished so; 
the straits would be under the international control with the terms of demilitarized 
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lands near to the straits.
20
 To put it concretely, the 62
nd
, 63
rd
 and 64
th
 Articles of 
Sevres Agreement stated the Mosul issue as follow; 
East of the Euphrates River, an Armenian border to be determined in 
accordance with the 27
th
 Article, sections two and three. Those areas of 
majority Kurdish population north of Syria and Iraq and within Turkey will 
be autonomous.
21
 
 
In the 63
rd
 Article; 
The Ottoman government declares from now that it will accept any decision 
and act upon it within three months, that is made by the committee to be. One 
year after this agreement goes into effect, the Kurds mentioned in Article 62, 
if those in regions where they make up the majority, can prove that they with 
to be independent from Turkey, can apply to the League of Nations, provided 
that they met the necessary requirements, Turkey declares that it will accept 
all the decisions made and relinquished all its claims and rights on the region. 
If this relinquishing of rights and claims by Turkey takes place, when it takes 
place, the parts of Kurdistan that have remained in the Mosul province until 
now with Kurds residing in it, can if they will it, join the independent Kurdish 
state.
22
 
 
  In the responses to this treaty, not only Turkish but also even some British 
leading officers criticized the feasibility of it because the Sevres treaty would be so 
severe that Turks would not ratify it. Consequently, the Sevres Agreement, which 
was completely reverse to the National Pact, which was accepted as the fundamental 
aim by the GNA, became invalid with the declaration of the GNA that all treaties, 
contracts or other obligations signed by the Istanbul government after March 16, 
1920 were invalid. Even though the Sevres Treaty was not ratified with the Turkish 
efforts, the Western attempts to disintegrate Turkey, leaving the small inner Anatolia, 
were enough to consolidate the “Sevres Syndrome” which has been continued until 
now among Turks. That is, some see a future independence for Kurds in northern 
Iraq as a return of the Sevres Agreement being imposed on Turkey once again. Also, 
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the Turkish syndrome about the Sevres Agreement reflected well in a letter Mustafa 
Barzani
23
 sent to President Jimmy Carter in February of 1997 as follows; 
The 1920 Sevres Agreement in equivalence with other nations that made up 
the Ottoman Empire gave Kurds the right to determine their own destiny. But 
international interests prevented Kurds from realizing this goal.
24
 
 
Such a view that have been voiced freely by the leaders of the Kurdish 
movements throughout the decades that followed the Lausanne Treaty caused 
rightful suspicions and fears among Turks about the true intentions of the Kurds that 
were asking for autonomy and independence in northern Iraq.  
Admittedly, Mustafa Kemal‟s desire to recovery the Mosul was expressed 
very well during the liberation war with Allied Powers. Even though there was not an 
official war between the British and Turkey in Mosul, the struggle of Turkish and 
Kurdish people against British was strong in order to save Mosul from the occupying 
British. Both during the First World War and after it, many Turk including the Iraqi 
Turkmen who mainly came from Kirkuk and Erbil died in battle for the purpose of 
saving the Mosul from British.
25
 Also, it is impressive that Turkish nationalists 
provided the material and morale support with the tribes in Mosul as much as it could, 
taking into consideration the fact that they did not have enough ability to assist the 
Mosul people due to the urgent demands in the front of the Anatolia and limited 
resources in terms of war materials. Also, Mustafa Kemal appointed Lieutenant-
Colonel Ö zdemir bey to the commander of regional forces including the region of 
Mosul in order to save Mosul by supporting the Revandiz revolts against the British 
occupation. Ö zdemir bey was real threat for the British. As one of the most effective 
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ways to consolidate the control in Mosul, the British recognized to need to cut the 
connection between the Turks and Kurds of Mosul in order to put the Kurds under 
British control. Therefore, the British began their operation on April 11, 1923. With 
the heavy bombardment, the British burned and demolished all of the cities they 
passed through and arrived at Revandiz on April 22, rendering the people of 
Revandiz to leave the city. Even though Turkish unit under the command of Ö zdemir 
Bey fled to Iran on April 29 due to the operations of British military, the British was 
impressed with Özdemir‟s resistance which lasted nine months. This was an end of 
plans for a Turkish operation in Mosul and the tribes lost all hope that the Turks 
would come back to the region.
26
 
On the other hand, the British efforts to consolidate their powers in Mosul, 
more broadly, in Iraq was represented in the Cairo conference of 1921 that set the 
parameters for Iraqi political life continued until the 1958 revolution. In order to 
make their claim for Mosul, the British established a legal, constitutional framework 
through this conference.
27
 Also, they thought that Faisal selected by the first King of 
Iraq by the British would be accepted by the growing Iraqi nationalist movement 
because of his role in the 1916 Arab Revolt against the Turks, his achievements as a 
leader of the Arab emancipation movement, and his general leadership qualities.
28
 
These efforts taken at the Cairo Conference was connected to the new Anglo-Iraqi 
Treaty of 1922. The British established Anglo-Iraqi Treaty
29
 used by British 
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argument in the Lausanne Conference
30
 and signed on October 10, 1922 in order to 
gain the legitimacy about the occupation of Mosul as well as to conceal the violation 
of the Mudros Armistice. However, this treaty was also invalid in that it came from 
the 94th and 132nd articles of the Treaty of Sevres, which was never ratified by 
legitimate Turkish government.
31
    
 
2.3 The Mosul in the Lausanne Treaty 
The decisive military victory over the Greeks made the Mudanya Convention, 
which ended the Turkish war of National Liberation with the Allied Powers, 
imperative and enabled the Turks to negotiate peace terms with the Allied Powers on 
an equal position even if she was a defeated country. There had been a controversial 
debate about achieving a solution about the Mosul issue in the peace conference held 
in Lausanne that officially held from November 20, 1922 to January 23, 1923.  
 
2.3.1 The Aims and Arguments of British  
As stated above, for British, Mosul was the important strategical point in 
protecting the stable route to India, obtaining the rich oil reserve and securing a 
bridgehead to pursuit the successful Middle Eastern policies. British delegation led 
by Lord Curzon
32
 argued persistently that the Mosul should be under the rule of 
                                                                                                                                          
which significantly increased the financial burden on Iraq, required Iraq to pay half the cost of 
supporting British resident officials, among other expenses. British obligations under the new treaty 
included providing various kinds of aid, notably military assistance, and proposing Iraq for 
membership in the League of Nations at the earliest moment. In effect, the treaty ensured that Iraq 
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British and remain within the boundaries of Iraq, suggesting the follows as the 
evidences supporting his arguments;
33
 
 The Mosul issue was so related to the boundary dispute that the plebiscite, 
which the Turkish delegation had offered, was not needed. Also, Kurds and 
Arabs not only had never asked for a plebiscite but also had not known what 
really it meant.  
 According to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922, both Britain and Iraq had the 
duty to protect the territorial integrity of Iraqi land. Therefore, Britain could 
not withdraw from Mosul due to its commitments to Arabs, the people of 
Iraq and the LoN.
34
 
 Based on the British statistics,35 the population composition of Turk in the 
Mosul was only 1/12 of the entire Mosul population. Therefore, the 
concession of Mosul to Turkey would ignore the opinions of Kurds and 
Arabs who not only did not have the same origins with Turks but also did 
not support Turks during WWI. 
 All the economic relationships of the Mosul Province relied upon Syria and 
Iraq mainly, not upon Turkey. 
 The Christian minority living in Mosul could not be left under the rule of 
Turkey. 
 Considering the close distance from Mosul to Baghdad, Turkey could 
challenge Iraq‟s security if Turkey gained the Mosul. 
 Mosul was occupied during WWI; as a result, the occupation of Mosul by 
British was legitimate. The important Turkish towns of the provinces such as 
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Kerkük and Altınköprü had been under the British before signing the 
armistice. Just after the Mudros armistice was signed, the city of Mosul was 
occupied because the information about signing the armistice was reached to 
the front lately.
36
 Furthermore, Lord Curzon said that the armistice contained 
several decrees that made the occupation possible and that a war ends not 
with an armistice but with a peace treaty. Also, he denied any connection of 
oil with the British.  
 
British arguments were unreasonable in various aspects only by seeking their 
own interests. First of all, the opposition to plebiscite Turkish delegation had offered 
was the self-contradiction in a sense that not only was the application of plebiscite 
the Western idea but also British argued that Iraqi people including Mosul had joined 
into the election to select the Faisal
37
 as the king of Iraq on August 23, 1922. 
Secondly, the argument that the information about signing the armistice was reached 
lately was only a poor excuse in order to hide the violation of the Mudros armistice. 
Thirdly, now that the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty that British argued was not ratified by the 
legitimate Turkish government, the British argument loses the persuasive power. 
Other vulnerabilities of British arguments were presented in the Turkish arguments 
that will be explained in next part as well.   
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 İhsan Ş. Kaymaz, op cit., pp.274-275. 
37
 King Faisal was installed on August 23, 1922 according to the result of a referendum. The British 
claimed that 96% of the Iraqi people (except 4% who were mainly Kurds and Turks living in Kirkuk) 
chose Faisal as the king of Iraq. However, the British claim of a majority vote for Faisal was nonsense. 
The plebiscite was restricted to notables and the people around them. The Kurds completely boycotted 
the referendum.  
 18 
2.3.2 The Aims and Arguments of Turkey 
For Turkey, it was essential to remain the Mosul in the boundaries of the 
National Pact due to the ethnographic, political, geographical economic, military-
strategic reasons. However, more significantly, at that time Mustafa Kemal was 
concerned about the possible autonomous Kurdistan state British would establish, 
which could encourage the Kurds living in South-Eastern area of Turkey to demand 
their full independence.
38
 The concerns of Mustafa Kemal at that time that the loss of 
Mosul can be the magnet to attract the Kurds living in southeastern Turkey well 
reflects the historical background in the security concerns of current Turkish 
situation.  
Admittedly, the Turkish arguments in the Lausanne Conference could be 
classified into five parts; 
 Racial reasons: Based on the Turkish statistics,39 the rate of Kurds and Turks 
who had lived in Mosul, Kirkuk and Suleymaniyah was the 4/5 of entire 
Mosul population. In addition, because there were about 170,000 Turkish, 
Kurdish and Arab migrant tribes who moved from season to season, it was 
impossible to calculate their exact number. As the National Pact did not 
involve any difference between Turks and Kurds in terms of race, religion 
and tradition, Turks responded to the British claim that Kurds were of 
Persian origin by saying that Kurds were Turanian in race.  
 Political reasons: The British claim that Kurds did not want to live together 
with Turks was a totally unfound allegation. And, the British army occupied 
Mosul after the Mudros Armistice was signed with the violation of it. Also, 
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there was no legal basis for the treaty that aimed to establish a mandate in 
Iraq because it has been a part of Ottoman Empire.  
 Historical reasons: Mosul was under Turkish rule since the 11th century. 
 Geographical-Economic reasons: Mosul was the part of Anatolia in terms of 
its climate and the structure of its land. With the respect of economics, the 
Mosul relied more upon Anatolia rather than Iraq because of the railway line 
that connected Mosul to the Mediterranean.  
 Military and Strategic reasons: The British argument that the boundary 
offered by Turkey, 60 miles from Baghdad, threatened the Iraqi security was 
unreasonable because capitals of many countries were located close to 
boundaries and Turks were at peace with Arabs for centuries.  
 
Turkish arguments were more reasonable than British in various aspects. First 
of all, the fact that even though Sevres treaty had envisaged the creation of an 
independent state in southeastern Anatolia and northern Iraq, Kurds fought alongside 
Turks in a Liberation War backs up the legitimacy of Turkish argument in terms of 
the racial reasons. In other words, the vast majority of both Turks and Kurds still 
identified themselves primarily through religion rather than any concept of race or 
nation argued by British. As the former part explained, the occupation of Mosul by 
British Army was the violation of the Mudros Armistice undoubtedly.  
Nevertheless, the sharp contrasted arguments between Britain and Turkey 
were started to be inclined toward the British favors because of various reasons; first, 
the British was superior in military technology particularly in terms of naval and air 
technology, second, the Greeks, even though defeated by Turkish nationalists army, 
could be rearmed and unleashed by British, third, a newly emerging nation, Turkey 
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needed to establish good relations with British if they wanted to strengthen their 
position in world politics, forth, even if the Soviet Union could be regarded as the 
ally of Turkey at the time of the Lausanne Conference, this alliance was not 
absolutely believable and also Turks was necessary to make British the 
counterweight to the Soviet Union, fifth, the British understood very well that 
Turkey did not have enough military capability to enter a new war against British 
because the National War of Liberation was only recently over and some other 
countries such as Italy would attack to Anatolia for its own interests without British 
supports, finally, Istanbul and the Straits were still under the occupation of Allied 
Powers.  
 As a result, when the Treaty of Lausanne was signed on July 24, 1923, the 
resolution of Mosul issue was postponed with the direct negotiation between two 
parties. The final decision about Mosul was stated in the 3rd article of the Treaty of 
Lausanne as follows; 
The frontier between Turkey and Iraq shall be laid down in friendly 
arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Britain within nine months. 
In the event of no agreement being reached between the two governments 
within the mentioned time, the dispute should be referred to the Council of 
League of Nations. The Turkish and British Governments reciprocally 
undertake that, pending the decision to be reached on the subject of frontier, 
no their military or other movement shall take place, which might modify in 
any way the present state of the territories of which the final fate will depend 
upon that decision.
40
 
 
 As stated in the 3rd article, the LoN had the right to decide the fate of Mosul 
issue if it was not solved between bilateral negotiations at the end of nine months.  
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2.4 The Resolution of the League of Nations about Mosul 
By the provision of the article 3 of the Lausanne Peace Agreement, Haliç 
Conference was held in Istanbul on May 19-June 5, 1924 with the aim to find out the 
solution about Mosul issue. Although the main purpose of this Conference was to 
achieve the mutual agreement about Mosul issue, British did not show any efforts to 
solve Mosul issue with the intention of transferring the Mosul issue to the LoN 
where British was a powerful member whereas Turkey was not the member of it at 
that time. The Haliç Conference could not reach a solution because the two 
government‟s arguments were little different from those made at Lausanne.  
The Council of LoN decided to establish a special commission
41
 to 
investigate local condition and opinion about whether the people of Mosul wanted to 
be remained in Iraq or in Turkey. Just after ending their missions, the commission 
submitted a report to the Council in September 1925 that Mosul should be under the 
rule of British mandate for 25 years and that the border between Turkey and Iraq 
should be the line which had been drawn in Brussels.
42
 However, this report had 
several significant contradictions. First of all, it was based on the last census carried 
out by the Iraqi authority that could not be understood with the common sense. The 
censuses of Britain, Turkey and Iraq are as follows;
43
 
Gov. Turkish Census: 
Statistics submitted 
in Lausanne 
Estimate made by 
British Political 
Officers in 1921 
Census by 
Iraq 
(1922-1924) 
Kurds 263,830 424,720 494,000 
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Arabs 43,210 185,763 166,941 
Turks 146,960 65,895 38,652 
Christians 31,000 62,225 61,336 
Jews - 16,865 11,897 
Yezidis 18,000 30,000 26,257 
Nomads 170,000 - - 
Total 673,000 785,648 801,090 
 
The indication of this table that Turkish population was about 38,000, even 
lower than 61 thousand of Christians could be considered as the evidence that the 
commission wanted to support the British view. Also, the report included as follows; 
“it is indisputable that Turkey retains her legal sovereignty over the disputed territory 
so long as she does not renounce her rights.”44 According to this sentence, the Mosul 
should be remained within the boundary of Turkey because she had never given up 
the Mosul. Furthermore, the report mentioned that “if a plebiscite had been made, the 
residents of Mosul would have wanted to stay in Iraq.”45  However, the Turkish 
proposal of plebiscite was not accepted and the report involved that Mosul had to 
stay under the mandate of Britain for an additional 25 years. On the other hand, the 
LoN rejected to the British request to include Hakkiari to be given to Iraq because of 
the presence of Nestorian Christians who had rebelled against the Ottoman Empire 
and could not return to Turkey. However, generally speaking, the decision of LoN 
about the Mosul issue was influenced by the British, the great power, accepting 
British arguments one-sidedly.  
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Turkish strong rejection against decisions of a commission that had many 
self-contradiction factors was an expected result. As a result of Turkey‟s objections, 
the Permanent Court of International Justice on September 19, 1925 gave an advisory 
opinion to the LoN. Just after receiving the negative decision made by the Court 
from Turkish viewpoint, the Council of LoN made a decision in the meeting on 
December 16, 1925 in which Turkish committee did not take part that the border 
between Turkey and Iraq would be Brussels line and the Mosul would be placed in 
Iraq under British mandate due to an Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. The reactions against the 
decision of LoN had been come out from the wide ranges in Turkey. The first 
reaction was the letter of Tevfik Rüştü, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, which was 
submitted at the meeting of the Council where Turkish representatives were absent 
on December 16, 1925. In the letter, he claimed that “the sovereign rights of a state 
over a territory can only come to an end with its consent and that therefore our 
sovereign rights over the whole of the province of Mosul remain intact in response to 
the decision of LoN.”46 Also, Turkey signed with the Soviet Union about the treaty 
of neutrality and friendship on December 17, 1925, the day after the LoN made its 
final decision.
47
 Also, within the Turkish public, the reaction was severe. It was 
written in Cumhuriyet (Turkish Daily Newspaper) of December 17, 1925; 
The League‟s decision “proves once more that the League of Nations is the 
servant of the strongest, namely Great Britain. Only in the medieval ages do 
we encounter such unjust and tyrannical decision. As the case was during our 
campaign for nationhood, so now the rights of the Turks are safe under the 
sharp bayonets of the Turks, and we know perfectly well how to take back 
with our hands „Turkish Mosul‟ –given to Great Britain by the League of 
Nations-just as we saved Adana, Bursa, İzmir and İstanbul.48 
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However, the strong reactions of Turkey were not connected to the practical 
actions including military operations. The reasons why Turkish government could 
not help receiving these decisions despite the strong reactions from Turkish 
politicians and public may be speculated as follows; 
-The External Factors; 
 Turkey was still isolated from the international society militarily and 
diplomatically. Therefore, Turkey needed British friendship for several 
reasons; the improvement of relationship with the Western nations, 
especially France, the doubtful trust about the Soviet Union, the concerns of 
military operations by Italy and Greece.  
-The Internal Factors; 
 Turkey did not enough military capability to engage a war with British 
because she had been war throughout 10 years from 1911 to 1922.  
 In order to recapture the modern civilization based on the Western values and 
recovery the damage of war, Turkey needed a peace and stability. 
 One of the largest revolts by Kurds mainly in the southeast territory of Turkey, 
the Shika Sid revolt
49
 caused by the abolition of Caliphate mainly not only 
weakened the Turkish claims on the Mosul region but also led Atatürk to 
make important changes in his Kurdish policy.
50
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These reasons restricted the likelihood of using the force against British and 
Turkey believed that Britain would consider going to war over the Mosul dispute 
since it was of vital importance for its interest. Therefore, Turkey was obliged to 
abandon the aim of the National Pact and followed the realism and non-adventurism 
based on the fundamental features of Atatürk‟s foreign policies.  
 
2.5 The Ankara Agreement 
The Ankara Agreement which decided the final status of Mosul issue was 
signed in June 25, 1926 among three governments including British, Turkey and Iraq. 
This agreement was composed of three parts, Borders, Good Relationships with 
Neighbors and General Provision including 18 articles.
51
 According to this Treaty, 
the Brussels line became the border line between Turkey and Iraq as the LoN 
decided and Turkey had the right to take a 10% share from the revenue of Mosul 
petroleum for 25 years. Instead of the 10% share, if Turkey wanted, then she could 
receive 500,000 Sterling in place of its share within one year. In a variety of sources, 
Turkey renounced its right of 10% royalty on Mosul oil in favor of a cash payment of 
500,000 Sterling. However, according to Hikmet Uluğbay, “Turkey had chosen to 
take a 10% royalty.”52 Also, in his research, “Turkey only had received two million 
Sterling less than the amount of money that should have been paid by Iraq. The real 
value of this unpaid money in today‟s value is somewhere between 755.2-1,644.7 
million dollars.”53  
Meanwhile, one of the most crucial weaknesses of the Ankara Agreement was 
that there was no legal guarantee about the Iraqi Turkmen. If a guarantee would have 
                                                 
51
 Süleyman Doğan, “Irakta Petrol Savaşı ve Türkmenler(Petroleum War in Iraq and Turkmen),” 
Kardaşlık, January-March 2003, p.17. 
52
 See Appendix C for the further information.  
53
 Hikmet Uluğbay, İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyete Petropolitik(The Oil Politics from the Empire to 
Republic), (Ankara: Ayraç Yanyınevi, 2003), pp.446-447.  
 26 
been included in the agreement, Turkey could have played a more active role in the 
massacres of the Iraqi Turkmen that will be explained in the next Chapter. As a result, 
the Mosul issue, unresolved since 1918, ended in the exact way Britain had hoped 
with the signing of the Ankara Treaty. This Treaty has given Turkey‟s southern 
borders their final shape even if it was at the expense of the Turkish National Pact. 
But, one of the most important things we must keep in mind is that as the Ankara 
Treaty indicated, “Turkey made a concession the Mosul to Iraq under the mandate of 
British, not to any ethnic groups, especially Kurds.”54   
 Undoubtedly, from the historical perspective Turkey who lost the region of 
Mosul due to the defeat in power politics has the political and legal interest in the 
Mosul and Kirkuk. That is, the occupation of Mosul by British army (in the violation 
of the Mudros Armistice) and one-sided resolution of LoN in favor of British has 
consolidated Turkish historical resentment about the loss of Mosul. To make matters 
more complicated, the more unstable the political situation of Iraq has become, if not 
the perfect chaos, the stronger Turkish historical resentment about Mosul would be.  
For example, according to Hasan Tunç, “if the region of Mosul including Kirkuk will 
not be left in the Iraq territory, the Ankara agreement also will remain invalid. And 
the situation of Mosul should be returned to the one prior to the sign of the Ankara 
Agreement by International law. With the invalidity of the Ankara Agreement, the 
province of Mosul should be made restitution to Turkey who had ruled the province 
of Mosul for about 1000 years.”55   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE TURKMEN ISSUE IN THE DEMOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT 
 
 
 
 3.1 Introduction 
 The warning of many Iraqi experts that the existence of racial, religious and 
cultural differences in Iraq may later develop into fissures affecting the united 
structure of the Iraqi society is totally justified, for Iraq has long suffered from a 
suppressive government.
56
 The diverse racial composition that has threatened the 
federal Iraq also has made Turkey to be concerned about it. The most crucial 
determinant of Turkish foreign policies toward Iraq since the Gulf War has been “the 
Iraqi Turkmen” 57  who has the all same origins including the ethnic, linguistic, 
cultural and historical aspects with Turks. Despite the fact that the Iraqi Turkmen is 
the third largest ethnic population in Iraq, they could not be organized politically due 
to the suppressive Iraqi regimes in the period between 1921-1991. Also, just after the 
operation of the No-Fly-Zone, in place of the improvement, the suppressed situation 
of Iraqi Turkmen has been exacerbated by the Kurds and Iraqi government ruled by 
Arabian leaders. In a concrete term, the demographic change in Kirkuk, original 
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Turkmen city, indicated the assimilation policies of Arab regimes and Kurdish 
groups. Indeed, the 1957 census showed that Kirkuk city (as distinguished from 
Kirkuk province or governorate) had a slightly larger Turkmen (39.8%) than Kurdish 
(35.1%). The Arabs (23.8%) was the third largest ethnic group in Kirkuk.
58
 The 1957 
census, on the other hand, indicated that Kirkuk province had a Kurdish majority of 
55 percent, while the Arabs numbered only 30.8% and the Turkmens 14.2%percent. 
The census taken in 1977 in the process of the Arabization policy showed that 
Kirkuk province had an Arab (44.41%), Kurds (37.53%), and Turkmen (16.31%).
59
 
Also, after the fall of Saddam regime in 2003, in order to change the demographic 
structure in Kirkuk, Kurdish groups have settled at least 500,000 Kurds in Kirkuk in 
the process of Kurdification policy, notwithstanding the fact that the expelled 
Kurdish people was 11,800 in the Saddam regime.
60
 To make matters worse, after 
the operation of No-Fly-Zone, Iraqi Turkmen had been exposed to the bidirectional 
pressures from the Kurds and Saddam regime. Theses atrocities against the Iraqi 
Turkmen have made Turkish people to be concerned about the developments of 
northern Iraq. Based on the significant fact that Iraqi Turkmen has been treated as the 
discriminated ethnic in Iraq where the ethnic identities are problematic, Turkey has 
defended the idea that Turkmen should have the same political, social and cultural 
rights like the other ethnic groups in Iraq. Through the evaluation of the situation of 
Iraqi Turkmen chronologically, the reason why Turkey has been concerned about the 
developments of northern Iraq can be addressed.  
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3.2 The Identity of Iraqi Turkmen 
 Defining the Iraqi Turkmen is the starting-point of analyzing the Iraqi 
Turkmen. Iraqi Turks were called by Iraqi Turkmen both during the process of 
Lausanne negotiation by British and after the 1958 coup by the Qasim regime. The 
fundamental reason for the change of term was that Iraqi Turks did not have a same 
origin from the Anatolian Turks. Ismet Pasha, the lead of the Turkish delegation, of 
course, opposed the use of term, “Iraqi Turkmen” strongly in the Lausanne 
negotiation. The term “Turkmen” was initialized after the 1958 coup among 
Turkmen, as it refers to the Oghuz who accepted Islam. The identity of Iraqi 
Turkmen can be clearly by collecting the information of Iraqi Turkmen in terms of 
the origin, settlement and population.  
  
3.2.1 Origin 
 The origin of Iraqi Turkmen based on the Oghuz who migrated from Central 
Asia to Iraq goes to back to year 54 of Hejira with the use of a Turkic Language. 
After this time, the immigration of Turkmen to Iraq occurred by many various 
political situations at different time. The first Turkmen immigration was the 
settlement of 2000 Turkmen in Basrah by the Umayyad
61
 commander, Ü baydullah 
bin Ziyad in 676 year.
62
 Turkmen who had the excellent power and skill in the battles 
and conflicts had been used by Abbasids.
63
 As a concrete example, the Caliph el-
Mutasım had tried to settle Turkmen in Iraq due to the deep trust in Turkmen. The 
unceasing immigrations had marked the peak during the Seljuk period (AD 1055-
1200) when Sultan Tuğrul Beg had occupied Baghdad and Abbasids dynasty on 
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January 25, 1055. With the protection of Caliph from the invasion of Shiite 
Büveyhoğulları in 1055, Tuğrul Bey, the Turkish ruler of Seljuk ruled the entire Iraq 
by 1200. During the period of Seljuk, the migration of Turks to Iraq was expanded, 
which the existence of Iraqi Turks had continued for 9 centuries. At that time, Iraqi 
Turks was called by Turkmen who accepted the Islam with the origin of Oghuz in 
terms of race firstly.
64
  Like Iraqi Seljuks, the Turkmen founded some states and 
princedom in Iraq such as “the state of Atabeylik (feudal city states); Mosul 
Atabeylik (Zengids), Erbil Atabeylik, Kirkuk Turkmen Kipchak Princedom, Ilhanlı, 
Karakoyunlu and Akkoyunlu states and ruled there until the expansion of the 
Ottoman Empire who included Mosul.”65 
 In the period of Ottoman Empire, northern Iraq was occupied by the Yavuz 
Sultan Selim in 1515. During the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent all Iraqi 
territory was under the rule of Ottoman Empire and Sultan Murad IV recaptured the 
Iraq after the regional revolt in 1638.
66
 Many Turkmens immigration was accordance 
with the period of Ottoman occupation about Iraq.
67
 
 
 3.2.2 Areas where Turkmen had lived 
 There has been a hot debate about the territory of Turkmen in Iraq. Despite 
big debates about it, many researchers
68
 have agreed with the fact that historically 
speaking, Iraqi Turkmen has lived in the areas extending from northwest to southeast 
of Iraq,
69
 what is called Turkmenli as the strip separating between Kurdish and Arab 
people. In other words, the settlement of Turkmenli has been the region starting from 
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Bedre region towards the east to the town of Telafar in the west of Mosul.
70
 Some 
scholars mentioned the strip as the “Great Road” close to all Turkmen villages.71 The 
settlement areas of Turkmen have a significant meaning in terms of the economic 
aspect. The strip from Bedre to Telafar where the Turkmen had used as the itinerary 
of postal service road was constructed between Istanbul and Baghdad in the period of 
Ottoman Empire.
72
 Moreover, even though approximately 50 thousand Turkmen 
resided in Baghdad, the settlement areas of Turkmen in Iraq had been restricted 
within certain boundaries of Mosul, Erbil, Kerkük, Diala and Slahaddin provinces. 
These areas are important because of the economic and strategic values; the richest 
and highest natural resources including sulfur, uranium, phosphorus and especially 
oil,
73
 the wide agricultural lands where can provide the rich foods wih most Iraqi 
people who do not have any irrigation
74
 and a kind of buffer zone between Kurdish 
and Arab settlements.   
 
 3.2.3 Populations 
 The population of Iraqi Turkmen has been a controversial issue from the time 
of Lausanne Conference to now. According to both the Western and Iraqi resources, 
they have argued that “the population of Iraqi Turkmen is not over 500,000, a less 
than 5% of total Iraqi population” whereas others including some Turkmen and 
Turkish scholars believe in about 2,500,000 Iraqi Turkmen, the 10% of total Iraqi 
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population.
75
 On the other hand, Kurdish researchers strongly have argued that more 
Kurdish people have lived in northern Iraq based on the statistical information 
provided by the Iraqi authority in order to acquire the political advantages.
76
Also, 
some historical resources indicated that the population of Iraqi Turkmen is between 
1.5 and 2 million.  
 The debate about the population of Turkmen comes from the fact that any 
attempts to take a census on a basis of the ethnic structure of communities in Iraq 
were not realized except for the 1957 census.
77
 In a sense, the 1957 census
78
 is 
noticeable to the result that 567,000 of the 6.3 million of Iraq‟s population were 
Turkmen.
79
 Namely, the argument that the population of Turkmen is estimated to be 
approximately 2.5 million today is calculated by the 1957 census provided by Iraqi 
government.
80
 In other words, if the total Iraqi population is 25 million today, it 
would be reasonable that the population of Turkmen is 2.5 million with the respect of 
10% at least based on the calculation of the 1957 census with a growth rate of 2.5 % 
annually.
81
 On contrast, the statistical information provided by the Iraqi authority 
indicated that the Turkmen have been shown as 2% of the overall population because 
of some political reasons. In addition, Kurdish resources stated that Turkmen 
population was 2.6% in 1957 census and this rate was reduced to 1.15% in the 1977 
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census.
82
 Therefore, it seems to be impossible to find the exact number of Turkmen 
in Iraq without the objective census by international organizations. However, it 
would be true that the calculation based on the 1957 census would be more reliable 
than others in that there were no exact censuses based on the ethnic structure of 
communities in Iraq only except the 1957 census.  
 
3.3 The Arabization in Northern Iraq (From 1921 to 1991) 
 The Iraqi Turkmen was isolated from the politics since the foundation of Iraq. 
They were exposed to massacres in 1924, 1946, 1959 and 1991. Turkmen leaders 
responsible for the protection of Turkmen rights were executed during the 1959 
Kirkuk maccacre and in 1980 by the Baath regime. Even though the Turkmen lived 
in stable period between 1963-1968, the assimilation policies pursuited by the Iraqi 
governments were not stopped. More importantly, the bloody conflicts between 
Arabs and Kurds damaged the Turkmen in a sense that most of conflicts occured in 
the areas of Turkmen majority despite the fact that Turkmen maintained a neutral 
position in the conflict of between Iraqi governments and Kurdish groups. Moreover, 
the Iran-Iraq war gave the Baath party to good chances to suppress the Turkmen by 
leading to the change of ethnic structure of Turkmen.  
  
3.3.1 The Turkmen in the Period of Mandate and Kingdom (1921-1958) 
 The basic policies of the Kingdom of Iraq during the time of Feisal I (1921-
1933) about Turkmen came from the anxiety that powerful neighbor, Turkey, could 
absorb the Turkmen with its territory. Such a concern made the Kingdom of Iraq to 
remain a mere spectator even under the victimization of Turkmen by other ethnic 
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groups, especially, Assyrian forces, in 1924 and deny their existence in Iraq
83
 with 
the deprivation of their cultural and educational rights.  
 Meanwhile, it was natural for Turkmen who had the equal rights in all aspects 
under the rule of Ottoman Empire not to comply with the difficult situation related to 
the limited opportunities by the Kingdom of Iraq. As a consequence, they were 
isolated from the Iraqi politics and then this situation made their political roles much 
weaker. 
  The first massacre in Kirkuk against Turkmen was occurred on May 4, 1924 
by the Teyyari (Levi) forces
84
 under the silent tolerance of British. Although there 
was no concrete evidence that British gave the direct support to the Teyyari who 
massacred the Turkmen, it was through this massacre that British achieved their aims 
to suppress the growing national awareness among Turkmen people
85
 by preventing 
Turkmen from acting in favor of Turkey at a period during which the Mosul 
negotiations were going on. However, the fact that British certainly aggravated 
ethno-religious relations by using an ethno-religious militia against Sunni, Shiite, 
Kurds and Turkmen could play a critical role in forming the condition where the 
Teyyari who had a close religious tie with British attacked to Turkmen with the 
machine gun. Furthermore, in the process of matter settlement, British refused to 
punish Levi responsible for this tragic event.  
The second massacre was broken out against Turkmens who demanded better 
labor condition required to civilized human rights legitimately to the Iraq Oil 
                                                 
83
 Kadir Mısıroğlu, Musul Meselesi ve Irak Türkleri(Mosul Issue and Iraqi Turks), (İstanbul: Sebil 
Yayınevi, 1985), p.191. 
84
 The Levy was composed of Assyrians regarded as the Christians in faith, and particularly was used 
during the 1920 rebellion.  
85
 Arshad Al-Hirmizi, The Turkmen Reality in Iraq, (İstanbul: Kirkuk Foundation, 2005), p.79. 
 35 
Company on July 12, 1946. In a demonstration held in the Gavurbağı (Gavurbahgi), 
5 Turkmen were killed and 14 Turkmen were wounded.
86
 
 Despite not only the first constitution of Iraq that provided no discrimination 
with Turkmen with the respect of the education but also the declaration in the LoN 
that Iraqi government would respect all minority rights in 1932, the Iraqi government 
terminated these rights of Turkmen completely in 1937. Furthermore, the Iraqi 
government deprived the Turkmen of various rights to found associations carrying 
out social and cultural activities as well as to publish in the Turkish language 
between 1936 and 1958.
87
 Of course, the status of Turkmen in Iraqi political system 
had changed with the relationship between Turkey and Iraq slightly. During King 
Feisal‟s visit to Turkey on July 8, 1931, “the Code of Local Languages” that 
Turkmen language was recognized as one of the local languages was put into 
effect.
88
 As a result of this visit, “Regulation, Trade and Residence Agreements” that 
regulated the residence of Turkish nationals in Iraq and Iraqi nationals in Turkey and 
that gave both nationals to the right to have employment and property made it easy 
for Turkmen to reside, work, carry out trade, acquire property and send their children 
to schools in Turkey.
89
 In the additional protocol of “the Treaty of Amity and Good 
Neighborhood” signed between Turkey and Iraq on March 29, 1946, “the Protocol 
of Educational and Cultural Cooperation under the Turkish-Iraqi Treaty of Amity” 
provided the Turkmen with the opportunity to attend Turkish Schools.
90
 
 However, generally speaking, the Iraqi Kingdom took steps in order to carry 
out the Arabization in northern Iraq and to change the ethnic structure in the period 
of Mandate and Kingdom. As a concrete example, the Iraqi Kingdom settled the 
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Arab tribes such as “Al-Ubeyd and Al-Cubur tribes on the Al Huvayca plain in the 
southwest of Kirkuk by distributing the lands to them and providing the irrigation 
project.” 91  Moreover, the policy of Arabization had been accelerated with the 
increasing fears of Iraqi Kingdom with some international events. For example, 
firstly, the solution of Hatay
92
 in favor of Turkey worsened the Turkmen situation in 
Iraq. Because the Iraqi Kingdom was afraid about the likelihood that northern Iraq 
was united to Turkey like the case of Hatay if the rights of Turkmen were upheld.
93
 
Secondly, in the unstable international security structure in 1930s by the Italian 
expansion under the leadership of Mussolini, Turkey sent the delegation to Baghdad 
in order to make the collective security organization, the Sadabad Pact.
94
 The visit of 
Turkish delegation to the Mosul and Kirkuk caused the excitement among the 
Turkmen. After returning to the Baghdad, Nuri as-Said, the Iraqi Prime Minister 
reported the Turkmen to the Cabinet as follows; 
The Turks should be kept under pressure all the time. They are likely to 
possess and rule us one day as they possessed and ruled the Abbasid state. We 
have just got rid of the Turkish authority, therefore let us do not allow them to 
do it again, let us be careful.
95
    
 
The social and cultural activities of Turkmen were forbidden and historical 
buildings belonging to Turkmen were destroyed by the policies of Arabization. Many 
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Turkmen intellectuals were arrested and exiled to southern areas after the visit of 
Turkish delegation.  
 In sum, during the time of mandate and Kingdom, the Turkmen were 
gradually exposed to the process of assimilation of Arabization by the Iraqi 
administration. With the development of Arabization policy, the demographic 
structure of Turkmen started to change. Such a suppressed situation of Turkmen 
during the rule of Iraqi monarchy had been continued to next Iraqi government after 
the regime change.  
 
3.3.2 The Iraqi Turkmen in Abd al-Karim Qasim Period (1958-1963) 
 The tranformation from the monarchy to republic gave the hope to Turkmen 
on the ground that they supported the military coup when General Abd al-Karim 
Qasim abolished the monarchy with the support from the leftist and Arab nationalist 
officers on July 14, 1958.
96
 Unlike the first delcaration of General Abd-al-Karim 
Qasim and his deputy General Al-Salem Aref
97
 that regarded Turkmen as one ethnic 
group who constituted the Iraq, the new government reversed an earlier opinion 
about rights of Turkmen equal to other ethnic groups.   
 . Even though the Turkmen was cooperative relationship with the Kurdish 
nationalists for the sake of resisting the Communist party because the Turkmen did 
not internalize the Communist idea, the return of Mollah Mustafa Barzani
98
 to 
Kirkuk cauesd tension between Kurdish groups and Turkmen. The third massacre of 
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Turkmen, following the 1924 and 1946 massacre, took place in 1959 just after the 
visit of Barzani to Kirkuk. Even if the victims of this event involved not only Arab 
nationalist as well as Baathists, Turkmen had been exposed to a great damage by this 
event in a sesne that it occured in the Kirkuk where reserved a majority of Turkmen.  
Before the outbreak of this massarce, Kurds and Communists were assigned 
to the main political posts in Kirkuk. For example, the moderate commander of the 
second division in Kirkuk was changed by the communist one. And Kurdish person 
was appointed as the mayor of Kirkuk. Furthermore, the Communists and Kurds 
under the aegis of the Iraqi government were under arms with the political and 
military superiority over Turkmen by using the Communism as a good excuse.
99
 
Although this event would give a damage to certain groups including Arab natinalist, 
Baathists and Turkmen, not communists, one of the most largest victims was the 
Turkmen who did not possess the political and military power in Iraq.  
Since the first gunfire on July 14, 1959, the massarce against Turkmen would 
be continued for three days.
100
 In the process of the 1959 Kirkuk massacre not only 
were the leading Turkmen persons killed but also main buildings belonging to 
Turkmens were vandalized. This massacre made the Turkmen being preoccupied 
with only the choice to immigrate to other areas, especially Baghdad in order to 
avoid the tragic repetition of the massacre coupled with the instability and 
unemployment. Also, the vacant space of Turkmen who left to other areas was 
replenished with Kurds and Arabs.  
 Meanwhile, the Iraqi society was awkened to new significance of Turkmen 
through the 1959 massacre. A lot of news which were published in the headlines 
about the Kirkuk massacre everyday made the Turkmen become a center of interest 
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between anti-communist Arabs, intellectuals and jounalists. The misunderstanding of 
which Arabs in southern Iraq called Turkmen “Kırad” which means Kurdish was 
corrected certainly even if the Iraqi republic proclaimed that Iraqi Turk were named 
as “Turkmen” just after the coup.  
On the other hand, in response to the oppressions by Iraqi governments and 
Kurds, Turkmen started to think about the unity, cooperation and interdependency 
among themselves through the foundation of the official and secret organizations.
101
 
The establishment of Turkmen Brotherhood Association (TBA)
102
 in 1960 could be 
understood within the context of follow-up measures of Turkmen who suffered the 
pain from the 1959 masscre. Although some people responsible for the 1959 
massacre were condemed to death, quite a few poeple were released and the death 
penalty of some people was not executed.
103
 On the other hand, according to Nuri 
Talabani, the 1959 massacre of which 31 Turkimen were killed and 180 were 
injured
104
 was “the direct root of separation and hostility between Turkmen and 
Kurds to this day.”105  
 
 3.3.3 The Iraqi Turkmen in Aref Brothers Period (1963-1968) 
 The officer group of Arab nationalists under the leadership of Abdul Al-
Salem Aref cooperating with the Arab Socialist Baath party overthrew the Qasim 
regime that faced with the external and internal problems
106
 through the coup in 
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February 1963.
107
 After Aref came to the power, some of prominent Turkmen leaders 
and administrator of the TBA required Aref to understand racial discrimination of 
Turkmen, especially the injustice of 1959 massacre.
108
 Those 28 people who had 
been sentenced death due to the responsibility of 1959 Kirkuk massacre were 
executed in Kirkuk on June 23, 1963. As the impartial execution of law by military 
junta indicated, under the rein of Aref Brother, Turkmen could live in a more stable 
period.
109
 
 Alongside the abolition of 1958 constitution, the new regime made public the 
termprary constitution including the article 19 that the Iraqi people were equal 
without any discrimination based on the ethnic structure, languages or other reasons 
and without considering difference in rights and duties.
110
 Namely, under the rule of 
the Abd Al-Rahman Muhammed Aref, the successor as well as the brother of Abdul 
Al-Salem Aref, Turkmen also enjoyed civil rights since the 1923 firstly. In concrete 
term, Dr. Nizamettin Arif, a Turkmen, was appointed to the position of the Minister 
of Economy and Commerce as deputy.
111
 The magazine Qradaslık published by the 
TBA could add the new part of Turkish alphabet between 1963 and 1968.  
 
3.3.4 The Iraqi Turkmen in Baath Period (1968-1991) 
 The coup against Aref Brothers regime was carried out by the Baathists based 
on the Baath doctrine on July 17, 1968 ideologically.
112
 Saddam Hussein who came 
to the power in 1979 was appointed to the position applicable to the second man 
owing to the distinguished services in the process of coup. The situation of Turkmen 
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in the Baath period  was deeply connected with the Baath doctrine. At the heart of 
Baath doctrine was a kind of Pan-Arab nationalism conceived as the proposition that 
the Arab nation separated artificially firstly by the Ottomans and then by Western 
imperialism and Zionism should be united within one Arab nation. Thus, the fact that 
northern Iraq was under Turkish rule for long years caused the Baathist party to seek 
for an assimilaton of Turkmen into Arabs with the inferiority complex. Those who 
opposed the Baath party were arrested and executed publicly in order to discourage 
the opposition movement. In the executed people, Nizamettin Arif, the Minister of 
Commerce as deputy from Turkmen was included.
113
 
 Meanwhile, temporary 1968 Consititution of Iraq that provided Turkmen with 
the rights equal to other ethnics was converted into the 1970 Iraqi Constitution based 
on the two major nationalities, “Arabs and Kurds”, ignoring the existence of 
Turkmen. In this Constitution, the offical languages were accepted as Arabic and 
Kurdish, granting the Kurdish autonomy in the Kurdish region.
114
 On the other hand, 
Baath party paid lip-service to Turkmen only by proclaiming documents related to 
cultural rights of minority in order to gain the support from them.
115
 Some 
documents issued by Iraq government such as “Cultural Rights of the Turkmen 
Nationals” and those covering the termination of racism and racial segregations of 
the United Nations Gerneral Assembly in 1970 had never been and would never be 
sincere.
 116
 According to Haradan Al-Tikriti, the former Minister of Defense in Iraq 
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who was one of those who played an important role in the coup in 1968, “the Baath 
party did not have any will to respect these rights.”117 
 The disappointment among Turkmen due to the nonfulfillment of policies 
related to the cultural rights by Baath party was connected to the protests. For Baath 
party, these protests were used by a good opportunity to assimilate Turkmen into 
Arabs. At that time, 50 Turkmen who protested to the discrimination policies were 
under the severe torture and detention in Kirkuk. In terms of political and economic 
areas, Turkmen could not work in the state place as well as could not have any 
support from the government.
118
Especially, the suppression against Turkmen 
language covered a wide range; the limitation of education of Turkmen language, the 
abolition of the schools who offered the Turkmen language, the exile of Turkmen 
teachers, the ban of the use of Latin alphabet in the Qardaslık magazine that the TBA 
published, the transfer of the control about the newspaper “Yurt” and 
magazine“Birlik Sesi” from the Association of Turkmen of Letters and Turkmen 
Directorate of Culture under the Ministry of Press to the Baath party.  
 To the contrary to the situation of Turkmen, the Baath party granted rights to 
the Kurds equal to those of Arabs with the agreement consisting of 15 articles related 
to their cultural, executive and political rights. Pursuant to this agreement between 
the Baath party and Kurds, not only would they be represented in parliament but also 
an autonomous Kurdish territory would be established, a Kurdish vice president 
would be appointed, the domestic income would be shared fairly and Kurdish 
language would be accepted as the official language with the Arabic in the Kurdish 
region.
119
 Therefore, based on this agreement, the destiny of Turkmen who would 
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subordinate themselves to either the Kurds or Arabs came to be determined by the 
plebiscite to find out the boundaries of Kurdish Autonomou Territory
120
 that was 
planned to be held on October 26, 1970. However, because of the increasing 
conflicts between Baathists and Kurds who followed the Barzani who wanted to gain 
their own favor in the plebiscite, the plebiscite was not held. One of the most 
important another obstacles between Baath regime and Kurds in holding the 
plebiscite was the Kirkuk where reserves a lot of natural resources, especially oil. 
Kurdish groups wanted to include the Kirkuk into the Kurdish region whereas the 
Baath party never had any intention to include the Kirkuk to the Kurdish region.  
 The process of Arabizaiton in northen Iraq where Turkmen made up the 
second largest ethnic group was committed under the support of central Iraqi 
government. Arabs who moved to the Kirkuk took the resettlement funds and 
financial supports from the Iraqi government. Due to theses policies, even villages 
composed of entire Turkmen were allocated to Arabs. The name of Kirkuk was 
changed to “Al-Tamim” which meant nationalization in accordance with the order of 
Presidency number 41 of January 20, 1976.
121
 The ban of sales of immovable 
property between Turkmen and the restriction of purchases of land and building for 
Turkmen worsened the conditions of Turkmen. Furthermore, for the sake of 
changing the ethnic structure of Turkmen fundamentally, Baath party gave the 10 
thousand Dinars ($33,000) to Arabs who married with the Turkmen girls.
122
 Also, the 
TBA who represented the Turkmen in Iraq lost their own functions by entering into 
the control of Baath party.
123
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 When Saddam Husein came into the power in 1979, the Turkmen should face 
with the most aweful violations of human rights based on the assimilation policies. 
Not only the contiunation of restrictions to the rights touched above had been 
maintained but also Turkmen leaders
124
 had been executed although they were 
innocent. The execution of Turkmen leaders who demanded as well as defended the 
Turkmen rights implanted the hoplelessness about Iraqi government in Turkmen. 
Subsequently, the despair of Turkmen about the Baath party was connected to seek 
refuge in other states.
125
 
 The Iran-Iraq war which had been continued for eight years supplied Saddam 
with a good opportunity to change the ethnic structure of Turkmen in 1980s.
126
 The 
Baghdad government dispatched many Turkmens to the front of battle, whereas a lot 
of Kurds were exempted from the military service. Both before and during the war, 
Iraqi government put many Turkmens to death on suspicions of being the espionage 
giving information to Turkey.   
 The unsafisfaction of Baath party about the assimilation policies had been 
connected to plan to force Turkmen to migrate from Kirkuk to the province of Amara 
in the south of Iraq by building 20,000 houses.
127
 Even if Iraqi government did not 
put this plan into practice due to the Arabs who fled from Basrah,
128
 the destory of 
Turkmen villages in Kirkuk was not stopped. Two thousand more houses were 
broken down becaue of various reasons in some Turkmen territories; building 
military facilities, a highway of a width of 600 meters and an international train 
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station and so on.
129
 In November 1985, in the name of search activities carried out 
by the Iraqi force, the Turkmen was looted and attacked by Arabs and in 1988, many 
Turkmen who lived in Telafer, the largest Turkmen town in Mosul district, were 
killed.
130
 In 1990 Republican Consitution of Iraq, the legal identity of Turkmen was 
refused once again with the declaration of government that Iraqi public is consisted 
of Arabs and Kurds.  
  
 3.4 The Kurdification in Northern Iraq (From 1991 to Now) 
While the safe region was being constructed by the U.S. and Britain with the 
operation of No-Fly-Zone, Kurds gained the opportunity to strengthen their political 
power to some extent to change the demographic structure of northern Iraq. Namely, 
the establishment of No-Fly-Zone fostered Kurdish nationalism in northern Iraq. The 
Turkmen was exposed to KDP and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) pressures 
and attacks led by Barzani and Talabani in particular since 1996. Turkmen was 
placed in much worse situation than before because the bidirectional pressures had 
come from Kurdish groups and Saddam regime. This is because 85% and 90% 
Turkmen populations were under the rule of Saddam regime after the operation of 
the No-Fly-Zone. And, Turkmen who was under the operation of No-Fly-Zone was 
exposed to the pressures of Kurdish groups.  
 After the Iraqi War of 2003, the Turkmen was also isolated from the 
reconstruction process of Iraq by the Coalition Forces Authority (CPA). It was 
natural that almost all interim Iraqi organizations including Governing Council and 
Governing Administration and the new constitution drafted by these organizations 
directed by the CPA did not consider the Turkmen rights. The Turkmen, who has 
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not gained any political rights in the newly established Iraqi government, likewise 
the past, has confronted with more serious Kurdification policies. In particular, the 
Kirkuk where Turkmen have made up the majority has been regarded as the Capital 
of Kurdistan by the Kurdish peshmerga, carrying out the Kurdification policy.  
 
            3.4.1 The Iraqi Turkmen from No-Fly-Zone Operation (1991-2003) 
 The invasion of Iraq to Kuwait
131
 on August 8, 1990 caused the huge 
reactions across the world and the Security Council of the United States (UNSC).
132
 
At the time of Iraqi defeat by the Coalition Forces under the American leadership, in 
March 1991 insurgent activities that began from the Iraqi Shiite region spread out 
northern Iraq.
133
 The suppression of Saddam regime against insurgencies produced 
the approximately 1,500,000 refugees in northern Iraq and then made them to seek 
to the refugee in Turkey and Iran.
134
 The noticeable thing was the fact that in 
conflicts between Kurds and military forces of Baghdad regime, Turkmen was the 
victims targeted by both sides. The fact that 28 Turkmen in Tazehurmatu and 
approximately one hundred Turkmen in Altünköprü were killed for no reasons by 
the military force from the Baghdad regime proved the tragic actions of Baghdad 
regime.
135
 And PUK and KDP invaded the governmental agencies and buildings and 
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burned the civil registration records with the aims to destroy the data regarding 
Turkmen existence in the region.
136
 
  In order to solve the problem of refugees, Turgut Ö zal, Turkish President 
initiated the buffer zone along the border. However, his proposal was refused 
because of the fear that the new Gaza Strip could be created. Instead, the U.S. 
President, George H.W Bush warned the Saddam to obey the “No-Fly-Zone” that 
declared the territory where military operations above the 36 parallel and fly over 
Iraqi airplanes had been forbidden.
137
 In fact, No-Fly-Zone was meaningless for 
Turkmen in that 85-90% of the entire Turkmen population were left outside No-Fly-
Zone, while the north of 36th parallel and the south of 32nd parallel were put under 
protection and thus Turkmen were actually divided into two. Also, Kirkuk and 
Mosul were placed under the authority of Baghdad regime. Although Suleymaniyah 
was under the line of 36 parallel, it was under the control of PUK led by Talabani.
138
 
 In the No-Fly-Zone that could not be controlled by any countries, the 
separatist Kurdish groups including KDP and PUK have tried to establish the 
independent Kurdistan state by using a created power vacuum in northern Iraq.
139
 
Such a movement of Kurdish groups gained a driving-force with the financial 
supports.
140
 In order to fill the authority gap in the newly-established area, 
parliamentary election was held on May 19, 1992. In the election into which 
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Turkmen did not participate, “KDP received 44.58% of the votes and PUK received 
44.33% of the votes. Both parties gained the 50 seats out of 105 seats and the 
remaining 5 seats were assigned to Assyrians.” 141  In the Draft of Constitution 
provided by the newly elected parliament in Erbil in 1992, Turkmen was portrayed 
as the minority instead of the nation, so was the election of parliament and Kirkuk 
was proclaimed as the capital of Kurdistan state. Soon after, KDP and PUK started a 
conflict by ending the cease-fire between them in order to maintain the priority over 
each other in northern Iraq.
142
 
In a conflict between KDP and PUK, PUK had the dominant power in Erbil 
in May 1993 and the result of parliament election was annulled.
143
 In order to take 
the reins in Erbil, KDP militia with the cooperation of Saddam‟s force made a 
surprise attack on Erbil on August 31, 1996. During the raids, Turkmen who took a 
neutral attitude suffered from this conflict, as the past nightmares although they 
maintained the neutral position. 34 Turkmen were killed or arrested and Turkmen 
schools built by the Iraqi National Turkmen Party (INTP)
144
 in Erbil were 
destroyed.
145
 As a consequence of 1996 Erbil raid, KDP became dominant in Erbil 
and Dohuk regions whereas PUK were settling into Suleymaniyah region. Both 
parties established their own administrations.
146
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Just after establishing their own administrations, both parties took serious 
steps not only for the foundation of the actual Kurdish state but also for the 
destruction of Turkmen attempts to obstruct to build the Kurdish state. The main 
policies that Local forces including KDP and PUK have pursued can be explained as 
followings; 
 Local forces regarded the Turkmen as the cat‟s-paw of foreign forces and 
required the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) to leave out the Erbil.
147
 
The main argument is that Turkey, the sponsor of Turkmen, has obstructed 
the political and economical development in northern Iraq through the use of 
Turkmen. Also, in order to infuse the biased image of Turkmen like betrayer into the 
Kurds, KDP has used the printed and visual press as tools. KDP succeeded in 
creating feelings of hatred among the Kurds in northern Iraq against Turkey and 
Turkmen.
148
   
 Local forces established puppet parties of Turkmen in order to disintegrate 
the Turkmen political movement.  
Puppet parties such as “Turkmen Brotherhood Party, Turkmen Unity Party, 
Kurdistan Turkmen Cultural Society, Turkmen Liberation Party, Turkmen Liberal 
Democratic Community, Turkmen People‟s Party, and Turkmen Naissance 
Party”149financed and established by the Kurds can be not so much the protector of 
Turkmen rights as the agencies used by the interests of Kurds, the U.S. and 
British.
150
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 Local forces attempted to get rid of a true Turkmen organization, especially 
ITF by force.  
On 10-11 August, 1998 when KDP militia made a raid against ITF, 86 
Turkmen security guards were arrested.
151
 Also, KDP militia attacked the buildings 
and organizations belonging to ITF on 11-12 July, 2000, leading to the tragic result 
that 2 Turkmen security guards were killed and 4 Turkmen were seriously 
wounded.
152
 These events made Turkmen to believe that the racist movement 
against them shall occur later and regional administration in northern Iraq exists 
only for Kurds.  
 With the transformation from the dual containment policy of the U.S. in 
1998
153
 to the policy of overthrowing the Saddam regime, the U.S. started to focus 
on Iraqi opposition groups. Through the mediation by the U.S., KDP and PUK 
signed the peace agreement in Washington in September 1998. The American 
efforts to overturn the Saddam regime and establish the democratic administration 
based on the human rights were operated with the establishment of the “Act on 
Saving Iraq” put into effect on January 20, 1999.154 The U.S. also began to contact 
the several Iraqi opposition parties who did not include any Turkmen organization. 
What the U.S. did not involve even one legal Turkmen organization in such an Act 
reflected Washington‟s negative view towards Turkmen. 
 In a meeting held on December 14-16, 2002 by Iraqi opposition groups, they 
declared that Iraq was consisted of Arabs, Kurds and others. This declaration meant 
that Turkmen who are the third largest ethnic group in Iraq was counted as the 
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equivalent to a few Assyrians. Once again, in the Iraqi opposition meeting held in 
Sleahaddin, Northern Iraq in February 2003 in order to discuss the destiny of Iraq 
after the fall of Saddam regime, Turkmen was not included in the composition of 
administration. KDP officials argued in the meeting that “the Turkmen was so small 
in the ethnic construction that they could not be considered.” 155 The argument of 
KDP could not be acceptable to Turkmen who are the second largest ethnic 
population in northern Iraq. In other words, it is natural that the initial exclusion of 
Turkmen in the process of discussing about the future of Iraq has been connected to 
the elimination of Turkmen rights in the reconstruction of new Iraq. 
 Meanwhile, Turkmen had being pressurized from not only Kurds but also 
Saddam regime since 1991 year.
156
 After the implementation of the embargo on Iraq, 
85-90% of Turkmen population under the Saddam regime was exposed to bad 
hunger, disease, poverty, unemployment and despair. All political and economic 
pressures forced the Turkmen to migrate to the Turkey, Europe and America.
157
  
 
3.4.2 The Iraqi Turkmen after 2003 Iraqi War (2003- Now) 
The U.S. declared war against Iraq on 19 March, 2003 with the aims to 
overthrow the Saddam regime, to destroy the weapons of mass destruction and to 
democratize the Iraq in the line of the continuation of the combat with terrorism. Yet, 
although the collapse of Saddam regime and the declaration of victory by G. W. 
Bush, the current President of the U.S., the unstable and fragile Iraqi situations are 
still going on with the increasing number of resistance movement.
158
 
                                                 
155
 Erşat Hürmüzlü, op cit., p.109. 
156
 Suphi Saatçı, 2001, op cit., pp.8-10. 
157
 Meşruk Y. Börklü, op cit., pp.6-9. 
158
 It was reported that number of attacks is 150/day, Iraqi civilian deaths is 94/day. According to Iraq 
Situation Report, approximately 63428 Iraqi civilians were killed until now.  
 52 
After the fall of Saddam regime that had subjugated the Turkmen, Turkmen 
was full of hopes that the U.S. would encourage the democratization to Iraq, as they 
justified their invasion as the improvement of democratization. However, the U.S. 
forces that opened northern Iraq front with the help of Kurdish groups has followed 
a pro-Kurdish policy against the Arabs and Turkmen rather than balanced policies 
among all ethnic groups. For instance, when the U.S. forces allocated the seats of 
Kirkuk provincial council to the ethnic groups, they did not reflect the impartial ratio 
of ethnic groups. What is worse, even the seats allocated to Turkmen were provided 
to Turkmen puppet parties.
159
 The U.S. and PUK peshmerga forces carried out an 
operation against the Turkish Liaison Team Office in Sulymaniah on July 4, 2003 
and 11 Turkish soldiers were under the detention as the result of this raid. This event 
gave the Turkmen to the psychological disappointment by showing that the Turkish 
officers were so weak that they could not protect themselves, let alone the Turkmen. 
During this raid, the branch of ITF was attacked and the Turkmen was arrested. Also, 
the joint operation of the U.S. forces and Kurdish militia in the Telafer region in 
September 2004 prior to the November 2004 census
160
 made thousands of Turkmen 
to become homeless. 
In terms of a formal political system of Iraq, the 25 members of Iraqi 
Governing Council established by the CPA on July 13, 2003 came from the party 
leader or representatives of political parties whereas no one of ITF who represented 
the Turkmen ethnic were not included in the member. The appointment of one 
Turkmen, Songül Ç abuk to the member as the one quota did not represent in 
proportion to the Turkmen population.
161
 Such a partial allocation was reflected in 
                                                 
159
 Giles Trendle, “A Hotbed of Ethnic Tension,” the Middle East, December 2003, p.13. 
160
 The census was not conducted due to the security and political reasons.  
161
 Mariam Shahin, “The Quota Council,” The Middle East, August/September 2003, p.10. 
 53 
the “Designated Interim Government”162. It was natural that Law of Administration 
for the State of Iraq for the Transnational Period (TAL) written by the Governing 
Council and the CPA portrayed the Turkmen as the position of minority, not as the 
third largest ethnic group. The new interim government selected on June 28, 2004, 
was a mosaic constructed to satisfy the Kurds and Shiites. The key positions were 
divided up between Shiites and Kurds. The members of KDP and PUK were 
appointed to the powerful positions.
163
 On the contrary, the Turkmen was once again 
ignored, as the only Turkmen who held a post under the Governing Council, Dr. 
Rashad Mandan, continued his symbolic role as Minister of Science and Technology. 
Pursuant to the TAL, the first democratic election in Iraq on January 30, 2005 was 
held in order to elect the „Transitional Government‟ which would draft a permanent 
constitution and establish the necessary conditions for the election of a permanent 
government. During this election, the Iraqi Shiites and Kurds went to cast their votes 
and the results of election gave all power to their respective political parties. The 
Iraqi Sunnis paid a heavy price for their boycott of the elections, as their diminishing 
status as political players in Iraq was dealt another heavy blow. After the elections, 
most of important posts including the prime minister, the vice president, the minister 
of interior and the oil minister were filled with the Iraqi Sunni. In the case of Kurds, 
Jalal Talabani, the PUK leader, became the new president of Iraq and Messud 
Barzani was happy with his role as the head of KRG. Also, the Foreign Minister of 
Iraq came from the Kurds. Also, through the election of January 2005 the temporary 
277 member Iraqi Council of Representatives were selected. 11 Turkmen entered 
into the National Assembly in total 277 seats. However, 4 out of 11 Turkmen came 
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from the „Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan and from the ITF there were 
only three Turkmen. 
Admittedly, the Transnational Government established through the election 
of January 2005 submitted the new proposed constitution to a referendum on 
October 15, 2005. The new constitution to set up a „Democratic Federal Iraqi 
Republic‟ got approved when 79% voted in favor in the referendum. 164  The 
referendum results conveyed just how polarized and divided Iraq had become along 
ethnic and sectarian line. In Kurdish and Shiite majority areas, the referendum for 
the draft constitution got approved with high margins, in some provinces as high as 
97%. On the other hand, the voters of Sunni Iraqi were only 24% in favor of the 
referendum. In the case of northern Iraq, the new constitution gained the 99% 
approval from Kurds whereas there was 14% approval in the Mosul and 2% in the 
Anbar.
165
 
Following the ratification of the Constitution of Iraq on October 15, 2005, a 
general election was held on 15 December, 2005 to elect a permanent 275 member 
Iraqi Council of Representatives. Although Iraqi Sunnis participated in this election, 
the power move in the Iraqi politics did not take place due to large segments of 
Sunnis Iraqi population that was discontent at the developments taking place. The 
Cabinet which resulted from the elections kept almost all important ministries either 
in Iraqi Shiite or Kurdish hands. In the case of Turkmen, even one Turkmen ministry 
of Youth and Sports was a part of the Kurdistani Gathering, Turkmen puppet party.  
 One of the most important regions where the Kurdification has prompted is 
the Kirkuk. Kirkuk adjacent to oil fields holding 40 % of Iraq‟s reserves as well as 
surrounded by some of Iraq‟s richest agricultural land can not be given up from the 
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Kurdish groups who have wanted to annex the Kirkuk to the Kurdish autonomous 
region by changing its demographic structure. However, the fact that Kirkuk is 
purely a Turkmen city prevented Kurdish groups from adding the Kirkuk to their 
autonomous territory. The desire to include the Kirkuk as the Kurdish territory was 
well presented in 1970s by the saying of Barzani; 
Even if one single person is determined to be of Kurdish origin according to 
the census which shall be conducted, Kirkuk shall be Kurdish territory. If we 
do not conquer Kirkuk, our struggle is useless. The Northern region which 
was legally left to our administration had been already in our hands in the 
past. Now we want Kirkuk.
166
 
 
 In order to change the demographic structure in Kirkuk, Kurdish groups 
burned the citizen records in Kirkuk and Mosul in April 10, 2003.
167
 Also, Kurdish 
groups have begun to settle the Kurds to Kirkuk to secure enough constituents 
capable to include the Kirkuk to the autonomous Kurdish region through a planned 
referendum based on the Article 58 of TAL.
168
 According to the Article 58 of TAL 
in the process of normalization that has restored the changed demographic structure 
to the original state priori to the Arabization in Kirkuk, the number of Kurdish 
immigrants to the Kirkuk reached 600,000 much more than 11,800 Kurds expelled 
from Kirkuk in the Saddam regime.
169
  
The situation of Kirkuk is stipulated in Article 140 of the new constitution of 
Iraq as follows;  
Article 140: 
First: The Executive Authority shall undertake the necessary steps to 
complete the implementation of the requirements of all subparagraphs of 
Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law. 
Second: The responsibility placed upon the executive branch of the Iraqi 
Transitional Government stipulated in Article 58 of the Transitional 
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Administrative Law shall extend and continue to the executive authority 
elected in accordance with this constitution, provided that it 
completes(normalization and census and concludes with a Referendum in 
Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the will of their citizens), 
in a period not to exceed(the thirty first of December two thousand and 
seven)
170
 
  
In other words, pursuant to the Iraqi Constitution (Art 140), Kurds have 
gained new legal rights to negotiate over Kirkuk and disputed lands as well as over 
other sensitive issues such as revenue sharing, petroleum rights and finances.   
 Until now, Barzani who evaluated that the migration of Kurds to Kirkuk was 
achieved to the good result in the referendum has argued as follows; 
All groups in Kurdistan will get to vote freely and according to their own 
conscience in the referendum. About 80% of Iraqi has agreed on the 
Constitution, and that Article 140 is the legal basis for dealing with the 
Kirkuk question. We need to go ahead with a referendum, as further delays 
can only destabilize the situation. Foreign intervention on this issue is 
unacceptable.
171
 
  
 In terms of the Kirkuk issue, the position of Turkey with a deeply close 
connection with Turkmen from the demographical perspective is based on the one 
postponing the referendum to an undisclosed date. Adbullah Gül, the current 
President of Turkey, while he was Foreign Minister in May of 2007, stated this 
issue; 
It‟s only a matter of time until the Kirkuk referendum gets postponed. Iraqi 
Constitution‟s Article 140 will determine Kirkuk‟s status. It should not be 
rushed into. It should take into account the welfare and future of all Iraqi 
people according to the will of all members of Iraqi parliament groups, with 
compromise in areas that will contribute to the final solution.
172
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Admittedly, the efforts of Kurdish groups not only to give the support to the 
PKK that will be explained in the next Chapter but also to change the demographic 
structure in the Kirkuk was well reflected in the report written by a Member of 
Parliament (MP) in the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, 
AKP), Mr. Ç ömez who was sent on a fact finding mission to northern Iraq as 
follows; 
PKK terrorists are settling in Kirkuk with heavy weaponry. Their 
Identification Cards are supplied by the KDP and PUK. The Turkmen 
community which I am in touch with stated that a lot of PKK terrorists are 
coming into Kirkuk. The outcome of the referendum which will be conducted 
in Kirkuk by the end of this year is predetermined and the intention behind it 
is obvious. Turkey should declare now that it will not recognize the 
referendum. There are 50 Kurds coming into Kirkuk for every Arab that 
leaves. The demographic structure of the region was seriously changed in 
favor of the Kurds.
173
 
 
Although in September of 2007 the Iraqi Parliament took a decision to 
postpone the proposed referendum to May 2008 due to the lack of technical 
preparation needed to conduct the referendum, the conflicts among Kurds, Arabs 
and Turkmen in Kirkuk has been increased. In Kirkuk where most of Iraq‟s ethnic 
and sectarian divisions meet, “it is possible that the civil war will be ignited.”174 
 In sum, Turkmen have been suffered from the assimilation policies by 
Arabian adminstrations and Kurds since the foundation of Iraq. And, the current 
situation of Turkmen has made Turkey to be concerned about the developments of 
northern Iraq because of its cultural and ethnic closeness with Turkmen.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE PKK TERRORISM IN THE POLITICAL CONTEXT 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The Kurdish question of Turkey who has the largest Kurdish population in 
the world have rooted in the Treaty of Sevres in 1920 when victorious powers in 
WWI agreed to establish an independent Kurdistan state in what now is southeastern 
Turkey and northern Iraq. Since that time, the Kurd question has occupied both the 
domestic and foreign policy of Turkey with the wide demands of Kurds from full 
secession to federalism and the recognition of individual rights as Turkish citizens 
within the framework of the process of Turkey‟s entry into the EU. The worst 
symptom of the Kurdish ethno-nationalism in contemporary history has been 
terrorism led by the PKK
175
 against the Turkish state and moderate Kurds. 
The establishment of PKK, terrorists organization, in 1974 by Abdullah 
Ö calan, a Kurdish student at Ankara University‟s Political Science Department has 
made the Kurdish question more complicated. The PKK have aimed at the creation 
of an independent Kurdistan state carved from the southeastern territories of Turkish 
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republic by using multi-dimensional political as well as military strategies. The 
fighting between Turkish soldiers and PKK has resulted in an estimated 37,000 
death
176
 in wide Turkish territories including main cities and southeast region since 
1984 with the increased Turkey‟s defense expenditure at the expense of education 
and healthcare.
177
 Also, the PKK has been used by both regional and Western states 
as the trump card in order to exercise their influence over Turkey. A world tour of 
Abdullah Ö calan, the leader of PKK, with the admissions of external powers 
represented the concrete example.
178
  
Undoubtedly, one of the main reasons for the sensitivity of Turkey towards 
the developments in northern Iraq is the Kurdish terrorist organization, PKK. More 
importantly, the problem of PKK that has challenged the Turkish security stability 
since its foundation has been much dangerous to Turkey than ever before because the 
emergence of autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq after the Operation of No-
Fly-Zone has functioned as the platform for PKK. Also, PKK has used the process of 
democratization of Turkey. To satisfy European Union access in rules, the Turkish 
parliament eliminated capital punishment, sparing Öcalan‟s life despite 
overwhelming public desire for his execution.
179
 In August 2003, the Turkish 
government passed an amnesty law, providing the group‟s members to a chance to 
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leave the PKK. Giving no attention to Turkish efforts, the PKK
180
 bombs and snipers 
killed twenty-three Turks inside Turkey on July 2006 and clashes continued after the 
cease-fire. Also, Turkey has feared that KRG who emerged actually in 1992 in 
northern Iraq serves as a center to attract the restive Kurds in Turkey or it might lend 
them to direct support by forming the sympathetic feeling of international society for 
the idea of wider Kurdish national self-determination, possibly leading ultimately to 
a sovereign Kurdish state who can include the southeastern Turkish territory.
181
 
To make matters more complicated, the cross border operations by Turkish 
Army have faced a difficulty to achieve the perfect elimination of PKK in northern 
Iraq due to diplomatic problems with Iraq, the opposition of KRG and a reluctant 
attitude of the U.S. about the cross border operation of Turkish military. Such a 
difficulty to operate the unilateral military attack against PKK has required Turkey to 
drag out the cooperation from other political actors. Furthermore, the Iraq war in 
2003 and the refusal of the Turkish government to join the U.S. troops created a new 
opportunity space for the PKK.  
 
4.2 The PKK since the No-Fly-Zone Operation 
Turkey has faced with the serious security concerns from PKK since its 
foundation. As many experts about PKK suggest, the strategic changes that 
ostensibly announced the end not only of the PKK‟s bid for a separate Kurdish state 
but also of the violent struggle for Turkish military have actually been a tactics in 
order to gain time to regroup the PKK terrorists.
182
 The PKK who moved into 
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northern Iraq where was under the power vacuum
183
 since the operation of No-Fly-
Zone supported by unilaterally the U.S. and U.K. has continued the terrorism attacks 
to Turkish military forces as well as civilians.  
Since the unilateral invasion of Iraq by the U.S. with Turkish refusal against 
American request to deploy the U.S. forces from the Turkish territory to northern 
Iraq in March, 2003, Turkey has faced with more difficult obstacles to eliminate the 
PKK. Anyone including the U.S., the Baghdad government and Kurdish groups 
(KDP and PUK) has not taken sincere steps against the PKK. The situation of post-
Iraq war has been flowed to be unfavorable to Turkey on the ground that it is 
without other political actors‟ cooperation, especially the U.S. and Kurdish groups 
that Turkish force can not root out PKK terrorists in northern Iraq. By the same 
token, the increasing sympathy and interest in PKK by Iraqi Kurds have intensified 
the Turkish concerns.  
In sum, the unwillingness of the U.S. about the Turkish cross border 
operations for sweeping out the PKK and the ethnic and cultural closeness of PKK 
to KDP and PUK, even if the Kurdish political parties have been hostile to each 
other sometimes because of the ideological and political objectives, have recreated 
the “Sevre Syndrome” to Turkey. 
 
4.2.1 No-Fly-Zone Operation and PKK  
 The time when northern Iraq was used the sanctuary by PKK firstly went 
back to the 2nd Congress
184
 of PKK held on August, 1982 in the Bekka valley under 
Syrian control. At that time, Messud Barzani, the leader of KDP, who controlled 
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northern Iraq did not refuse the PKK because Syria approached him for permissions. 
While some PKK terrorists crossed directly to northern Iraq, those who could not do 
due to the Iraqi security controls were transported through Iran with the help of the 
Iranian intelligence.
185
 That is, the triangle of Syrian, Iranian and KDP/PUK 
assistance allowed the PKK to act freely in northern Iraq. However, the emergence 
of northern Iraq where has functioned as the breeding ground for the PKK seriously 
coincided with the No-Fly-Zone operation.  
 The violent suppression of Iraqi Kurdish rebellions staged in the wake of 
Sadam regime‟s defeat by coalition forces in February 1991 triggered the 
international atmosphere to consolidate the Iraqi Kurdish autonomy. The 
international interests in the Iraqi Kurds‟ tragedy led to the adoption of UNSCR 688 
on April 5, 1991, deciding that the situation of Iraq was a “threat to the peace.” 
Several Western powers based on this resolution imposed a No-Fly-Zone north of 
the 36th parallel, deploying 15,000 troops to northern Iraq to create a Iraqi Kurdish 
safe area.
186
 However, the noticeable thing is that the Western military intervention 
in northern Iraq included a legal problem in that there was no Security Council 
mandate authorizing military measures to enforce resolution 688 which ensured the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq.
187
 
 Dubbed “Operation Provide Comfort” and renamed “Operation Northern 
Watch” in 1996, the operation basically was undertaken from Turkey‟s Incirlik 
airbase. As explained above, Turgut Ö zal, the President of Turkey was one of the 
strongest advocators, or perhaps even the architect, of the concept of a safe haven 
for Kurds as the solution to deal with the humanitarian crisis that accompanied the 
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sudden influx of nearly half a million refugees. However, from the Turkish 
perspective, active involvement into the enforcement of No-Fly-Zone has confronted 
with numerous dilemmas as the time goes by. That is, the aim of No-Fly-Zone to 
consolidate the Kurdish autonomy with the goal to deter Saddam regime from 
mistreating its Kurdish population paved the way for stationing the PKK because 
northern Iraq became the free autonomous region without the control of the central 
Baghdad government. In short, “Operation Provide Comfort/Operation Northern 
Watch could be regarded as the double-edged sword from Turkey; as a necessary 
humanitarian tool to protect Iraqi Kurds by taking preventive measures about the 
refugee problem and at the same time as a shelter of the PKK.”188 In other words, 
the PKK‟s activities inside Turkey were immensely facilitated when the reassurance 
of sanctuary in northern Iraq was so freely available at no cost. The absence of the 
effective central authority in northern Iraq and continued battle for many years 
between KDP and PUK further had consolidated the PKK‟s ability to menace 
Turkey from the outside. Turkish concern about No-Fly-Zone operation was 
reflected in the briefing addressed by Yaşar Büyükanıt, Turkey‟s General Staff on 
12 April, 2007 who stated the relationship between No-Fly-Zone of 36th parallel and 
PKK as follows: 
The No-Fly-Zone also established a protected area for PKK forces to operate 
in. This situation still continues. The list of casualties I stated previously, all 
correspond to this time frame, this was the turning point. Unfortunately the 
third has also been as a result of another Gulf War. Turkey has once again 
been hurt by the war for two reasons. The first being, it has been locked into 
its geography. The second being, PKK has gained immense freedom and huge 
amounts of weapons and ammunitions have fallen into its hands from the 
remains of the former Iraqi army. You might ask this: „Should a military 
operation be conducted in northern Iraq?‟ Yes it should. This has two 
dimensions. The first, when looked at through the eyes of the military, yes it 
should be conducted. Will it have benefits? Yes it will.
189
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The message given in this speech draw conclusion that since the No-Fly-Zone 
Operation, the PKK has been able to deliver blows to the Turkish security forces. 
Considering the fact that the PKK has always prospered when Turkey‟s neighboring 
regions have been unstable, northern Iraq has become the most suitable breeding 
ground for PKK.  
On the other hand, the PKK decided to concentrate on the political struggle 
rather than military one in the 6
th
 Congress held on August 5-22, 2001, following the 
declarations of Ö calan in trial.
190
 Despite the fact that the terrors by PKK were 
decreased to the extinguished level between 2000-2002, the tactical changes of PKK 
have made Turkey to be faced with the difficulty to detect the PKK terrorists who 
acted under the mask of political rights.
191
 With the strong demands of EU to Turkey 
in terms of political reformations, the political struggles of PKK inside Turkey has 
been intensified, following a somewhat success in the election system.
192
 
 
4.2.2 The PKK since the Iraq War 
Turkish opposition to the U.S. invasion against Iraq in 2003 due to the fears 
over the ramifications for the Kurdish issue was neglected by the U.S. As the time 
goes by, the Turkish fear about PKK supported by the Iraqi Kurdish groups in 
northern Iraq has become evident. Furthermore, the Turkish unwillingness to support 
the U.S. war in Iraq in March 2003 has made Turkey to be remained on the sidelines 
and undercut its working relationship with the U.S. military.  
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The war in Iraq provided the PKK with a good opportunity to consolidate its 
safe haven in northern Iraq strongly. Moreover, Iraqi Kurds groups (KDP and PUK) 
did not have any intention to take actions against the PKK.
193
 If the KDP and PUK 
would cut the logistical lifelines for the PKK, the group would be hard to survive. 
But rather than crack down, the PUK and especially KDP see the PKK as a useful 
bargaining chip with Turkey.
194
 Also, the U.S. who has played a critical role in 
rebuilding the post-war Iraq, despite White House rhetoric of a global war on 
terrorism,
195
 has not taken concrete steps in dealing with the PKK terrorists who 
have stationed in northern Iraq. To make matters worse, the Iraqi government of 
Baghdad, traditionally the Kurd‟s worst enemy, is now reliant on Kurdish support 
for its existence. The fact that since 2003, no military actions has been taken against 
PKK on Iraqi soil by anyone proved the silent tolerance of the U.S., Iraq and KRG 
about PKK. Under the silent tolerance of them, at least perhaps 5,000 PKK members 
enjoy refuge in northern Iraq and they established an enclave in various areas of 
northern Iraq including Kandil Mountain on the Iraq-Iran border as a sanctuary.
196
 
More importantly, the expansion of PKK into northern Iraq has occurred with the 
systemic supports by Kurdish groups, for example, giving the identification cards, 
weapons and foods to the PKK.  
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The sympathy as well as support of Iraqi Kurds to the PKK has been 
announced publicly in northern Iraq controlled by KRG. Denise Natali who lectures 
at the Politics and International Relations Department of the University of Kurdistan 
in Erbil explained the move of Iraqi Kurds feeling about PKK as follows: 
Kirkuk and Turkey are the two issues that unite people here. This discussion 
has done Turkey no good at all. People‟s (Iraqi Kurds) sympathy for the PKK 
has been growing greatly- although it‟s not an ideological sympathy, but a 
sympathy for them as the people who are still carrying on the national 
struggle.
197
 
 
 Moreover, while many Iraqi Kurds have started to recognize the Kurdish 
parties (KDP and PUK) as the tarnished groups, the PKK has been regarded as a 
more pristine nationalist profile by them. The sympathy to the PKK of Kurds in the 
Kurdistan region has been dispersed with the television programs that have portrayed 
the PKK as the heroic organization battling for Kurdistan against Turkish oppression. 
These deep sympathies may well be pushing Iraq‟s Kurdish parties to take stronger 
positions on both Kirkuk and Ankara‟s demands for military operations against the 
PKK. 
 The PKK increasingly also has taken advantages of Turkey‟s relaxed political 
environment to complement its military wing with a political front. For example, 
DTP composed by three former Turkish parliamentary deputies from People‟s 
Democracy Party (Kurdish Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, HADEP) on October 23, 2005 
was deeply related to the Ö calan. What is more, Ö calan also acknowledged his role 
in shaping DTP‟s policies published in the Kurdish nationalist daily Ö zgür 
Politika.
198
 The growing prominence of DTP who won 24 seats in Turkey‟s 500 seat 
parliament held at the July 2007 elections in Turkish politics suggests that while 
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previously Kurdish nationalist political parties such as HADEP closed down in 2003 
by the determination of Turkey‟s Constitutional Court because of its perceived links 
to the PKK were secondary to the PKK, now the political party is the main body of 
the organization with the military wing working for its sake in northern Iraq.
199
 Such 
a change of PKK with the respect of the change of their tactics was presented in the 
warning of PKK to other political parties exception to DTP in 2007 election as 
follows; 
With the exception of DTP all candidates in Van and Hakkari from CHP, 
MHP, DYP and AKP must withdraw themselves and offer their support to 
Kurdish people. Our people must demonstrate their Kurdishness in the 
elections. If any different approach develops, our approach will also be 
different. [...] Whoever continues the activities we mentioned here will be 
punished. Who ever damages our movement or our party [DTP] will not be 
forgiven in any way. They should know that they are facing death.
200
 
  
Since the Iraq war, the PKK have restarted to launch the military attack 
against Turkey. One of the PKK leaders, Murat Karayılan claimed that “the 
Lausanne Treaty remained invalid because the Saddam regime was fallen, requiring 
the Legitimate Self-Defense War to the PKK terrorists in order to accelerate the 
political struggles and to demand the release of Abdullah Ö calan to Turkey.” More 
importantly, in the Congress held on May 6-16, 2004, Osman Ö calan (the brother of 
Abdullah Ö calan) demanded “the PKK terrorists to restart the violent attacks under 
the name of the Legitimate Self-Defense War with the abolition of the temporary 
cease-fire for six years.”201 In May 2004, disappointed by the Turkey‟s reluctance to 
ease the conditions of his imprisonment, Ö calan ordered the PKK who retained still 
around 5000 militants under arms in the mountains of northern Iraq to resume its 
terrorist attack to Turkey from June 2004 in spite of the objection of most PKK 
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leadership based on the acknowledgment that their organization was too weak to 
fight with Turkish security forces. More importantly, despite the order of Ö calan to 
restart the terrors, it would be impossible for the PKK to restart the terror attacks 
without the help of Iraqi Kurdish groups, especially KDP. With the restarting of the 
violent struggle, the PKK changed their military tactics based on the effectiveness in 
terms of the military strategies; firstly, the PKK has pursued a two-front strategy 
combining a rural insurgency in southeastern Turkey with an urban bombing 
campaign,
202
 adding the political struggles through the use of DTP mentioned above, 
secondly, the PKK has attacked to inflict high casualties and to secure a propaganda 
victory nowadays rather than to seize territory, with the recognition that they can not 
achieve the military victory over the Turkish force, at the same time, avoiding a high 
number of casualties during the early 1990s. In line with the change of their 
strategies, the PKK began to launch operations using over 100 militants, giving up 
the mass attacks with as many as 500 militants highly vulnerable to hot pursuit 
operations, in particular, the attack of Cobra Helicopter, by the Turkish military.
203
 
Under the help of Iraqi Kurds and the American tolerance, the PKK who 
could be armed with heavy weapons remained by the defeated Saddam forces
204
 has 
started to launch operations against Turkish security force, resulting in 23 casualties 
on July 2006 and sequent nearly 40 casualties of Turkish soldiers in October 2007. 
Behind the bold change of the PKK‟s tactic from temporary cease-fire to the violent 
attack was the belief that Washington would prevent Turkey from launching a 
military incursion against the bases of PKK in northern Iraq.
205
 By the same token, to 
be sure, the PKK wants Turkey to engage in full-scale warfare not just with the PKK 
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in northern Iraq but with the Iraqi Kurdish groups and to draw in the U.S. and other 
foreign powers.  
 
4.3 Turkish Strategies to Eliminate the PKK in Northern Iraq 
Turkey has tried to sweep out the PKK in northern Iraq since the first station 
of PKK in northern Iraq. One of the most representative methods for Turkey to use 
has been the cross border operations. However, the main obstacles against these 
military operations have been revealed with the pressures from Iraqi Kurdish parties 
and especially the U.S. Although there was a bilateral agreement about the cross 
border operation between Turkey and Iraq, this agreement was cancelled by Iraq 
unilaterally in 1988. Also, the insufficient information about where the PKK have 
been stationed in northern Iraq may damage to innocent Iraqi people, rendering the 
international society to demand the Turkey to stop the cross border operations. It 
becomes more difficult for Turkey to collect the precise information about PKK, 
considering the fissure between the U.S. and Turkey after the 2003 Turkish refusal 
to the American request.  
Since the 2003 Iraqi war, unilateral cross border operations by Turkey have 
been almost impossible without the consent of the U.S. The U.S. reluctance to agree 
with Turkish operations is not so much due to both countries‟ restricted relationship 
recently as due to the U.S. strategic aim to maintain the stability in northern Iraq. 
Because, the U.S. do not want a little stable northern Iraq to be become other 
unstable regions of Iraq. Also, the growing sympathy to the PKK as well as hostility 
against Turkey in the issue of Kirkuk among Iraqi Kurds also have played a critical 
role in forming the change of Kurdish parties‟ policy about the PKK.  
 70 
Under such limited situations, Turkey has tried to gain the support from other 
political actors in eliminating the PKK in northern Iraq with the use of military 
means. The cooperation with neighboring countries and the diplomatic efforts to 
isolate the PKK from the outside helps can be interpreted within the context of 
sharing of the basic concept with other political actors that terrorist groups should be 
suppressed. In particular, such recognition of Turkey that the decisive factor in 
eliminating the PKK in northern Iraq depends on the cooperation of Kurdish groups 
(KDP and PUK) has been connected to practical policies.  
 
4.3.1 Cross Border Operations of the Turkish Military 
The legal basis for the 25 cross border operations that the Turkish Armed 
Forces conducted from 1983 to 2008 was the February 1983 treaty between Turkey 
and Iraq on „Border Security and Cooperation.‟206 This treaty allowed both states to 
engage in hot pursuit of terrorists. The term „Hot Pursuit‟ founded on a 1982 United 
Nations Maritime Law that permitted states to pursue those who have violated its 
law into international borders if need be.
207
 However, this treaty was concealed by 
Iraq in 1988 because Turkey refused the request of Iraq who would want to cross 
into Turkish soil in pursuit of Kurdish refugees on the ground that the refugees did 
not present a national security threat to Iraq.
208
 Consequently, the Iraqi government 
protested against cross border operations by Turkish military in northern Iraq. 
However, the cross border operations of Turkey were the inevitable choice since 
Saddam regime was supporting the PKK terrorists at that time.  
There had been 25 cross border operations the Turkish military engaged in 
from 1983 to 2008. More importantly, the thing we should keep in mind is that in 
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February 2008, the restart of cross border operation in a more decade has been 
launched in response to the increasing terror attacks by the PKK founded in the 
bases in northern Iraq. It will be more reasonable to look at the major operations that 
effected on the PKK rather than the chronological operations.  
 The first military incursion into northern Iraq by Turkish Armed Forces was 
May 25, 1983 when the PKK had settled into the camps owned and operated by the 
KDP as well as located in very close Turkish border. About 7,000 Turkish troop that 
crossed 5 km into the Iraqi border attacked KDP camps.
209
 The success of this 
operation could be measured through the words of Şemdin Sakık, the PKK‟s top 
militant at that time. Sakık captured in a secret raid in northern Iraq on April 13, 
1998 recalled, “I was at the KDP-controlled „Haftanin‟ Camp on 22nd May, 1983 
(the period of the Turkish Military Operation). We felt defeated, destroyed. On 15th 
June, 1983, I crossed back into Şırnak.”210  
 Admittedly, it was possible for Turkish military to achieve the modernization 
in terms of weapons related to attack the terrorists under the full support by Turgut 
Ö zal government in 1990s. Especially, the purchase of AH-1 W Super Corbra Attack 
Helicopters that could operate at night through 1990 improved the ability to oppress 
the PKK without the restriction of the time.
211
 Furthermore, there were three major 
military incursions into northern Iraq during the Demiral and Ç iller governments. 
The first operation during this time was the Hakur Operation (Hakur Operatoion) of 
October 1992 that aimed to destroy attempts of PKK to create „salvaged‟ areas free 
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of the presence of Turkish Armed Forces during the Demiral government.
212
 In the 
case of the second operation, Zeli Operasyonu (Zeli Operation) of January 1994, 
Turkish army crossed into northern Iraq with the heavy booming under the Ç iller 
government. The third major incursion into northern Iraq under the Ç iller 
government was Ç elik Operasyonu (Steel Operation) on March 1995 that was the 
biggest military operation conducted by the Turkish military outside to its borders. 
Around 35,000 troops with the air support attacked the PKK located in the city of 
Zakho close to the Turkish border. At that time Turkey believed that PKK would 
cease to be a major threat to Turkish security forces any longer because of the deep 
damage by the operation. Below is that then Prime Minister, Tansu Ç iller talked 
about the operation in March of 1995: 
This is not a 10 day operation! We will stay until we are a 100% satisfied 
that we have met our objectives. We did not limit our operation in time or in 
scope. This will be a decisive blow to the PKK. We needed to clean Northern 
Iraq to fully control the regions on our side. Due to the lack of authority 
present there, and disputes between Barzani and Talabani, PKK was able to 
gain strength in Northern Iraq.
213
 
 
The products of Ç iller government who was the most enthusiastic for 
fighting PKK terrorist was connected to the scatter of PKK around northern Iraq. In 
the sixth Congress of the PKK held through 1st May, 1996 to 15th May 1996, after 
this operation Ö calan decided to adopt the strategy of suicide attacks. The 
determination to take the suicide attacks by PKK was interpreted by many analysts 
as the difficult situation of them who were driven to the last ditch.
214
 
In 15th May, 1997 when 10,000 Turkish Armed Forces armed by 250 tank 
undertook the cross border operation, so called Balyoz Operasyonu (Hammer 
                                                 
212“Chronology of the PKK Terrorist Organization, 1978-2006,” International Strategic Research 
Organization, 2006; also available at http:// www.usakgundem.com/pdfs/USAK_PKK_Kronoloji.pdf. 
213
 Lyons, “Turkish Jets Blast Kurds in Iraq,” The Independent Newspaper, March 21, 1995. 
214
 Saygı Öztürk, Madalyalı Mahkım(Convict With a Medal), (İstanbul: Doğan press, 2007), p.109. 
 73 
Operation), under the air support, 87 terrorists would be killed and the number of 
PKK terrorists would be decreased to 1200 according to the briefing provided by 
Chief of Turkish General Staff. 
215
 
As stated above, the cross border operations by the Turkish Armed Forces in 
1990s under the full support of the administration have made the PKK to find itself 
losing ground on all fronts. Successive cross border operations by the Turkish 
military in the 1990s would destroy PKK‟s bases and camps in northern Iraq. 
Although Turkish military efforts to eliminate the PKK both within the Turkish 
territory and in northern Iraq have produced many casualties in the side of Turkey 
also, the necessities to undertake the cross border operation continuously were well 
reflected on the briefing by General Yaşar Büyükanıt, current Chief of Turkish 
General Staff as follows: 
In the year 1992: 496 soldiers died in action, 955 wounded due to the battle 
with PKK terrorism, in 1993: 538 soldiers died in action, 996 wounded, in 
1994: 867 died in action, 206 wounded, in 1995: 615 died in action, 342 
wounded. To day you can not generate solutions by keeping the PKK 
separate from northern Iraq and northern Iraq separate from the rest of Iraq. 
They are all organically related. The first turning point in the war against the 
PKK was the first Gulf War. During this war Turkey gave full support to the 
Coalition forces. But in the end Turkey ended up suffering as a result. At the 
end of the war hundreds of thousands of refugees piled up at Turkey‟s 
borders.
216
 
 
Also, Turkish Military Operations against PKK including cross border 
operations have helped decrease the number of PKK terrorists and PKK terrors, 
leading to the success if not perfectly. According to a report by the General Staff of 
the Turkish military, the number of PKK terrors fell steadily from 3,328 in 1994, to 
1,500 in 1996, and to 589 in 1998. Similarly, the number of PKK terrorists dropped 
from approximately 10,000 (both inside and outside Turkey) in 1994 to 4,000 in 
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1999 and the PKK was able to keep only 25 percent of them within the country, 
compared to 65 percent in 1994.
217
  
Most recently, following air raids of Turkish F-16s against PKK bases in 
Qandil Mountain, Güneş Hareketi (Sun operation) began on 21st February 2008 
when 10,000 Turkish Armed Forces who crossed into northern Iraq struck at PKK 
despite the protest of the Iraqi Kurds.
218
 The restart of the first substantial ground 
operation in more than a decade illustrated the Turkish concerns about northern Iraq 
where has functioned as the shelter of PKK terrorists.
219
  
  
4.3.2 The Cooperation with Other Political Actors 
It is absolutely true that 25 cross border operations would greatly contribute 
to weaken the capability of PKK in northern Iraq. However, it is also true that only 
the military actions can not eliminate the existence of PKK in northern Iraq on a 
ground that the external powers have used the PKK as trump card to counterweight 
to Turkey in order to maintain the influence into Turkey. As the historical events 
indicated, the PKK could not struggle against Turkish security forces without 
outside helps including Syria, Iran, Armenia, Greece and Iraqi Kurdish groups. For 
example, Syria offered the safe heaven to Ö calan in 1990s. Iran who had taken 
ambiguous position vis-a-vis Kurdish separatism in Turkey and Iraq allowed the 
PKK to use Iranian territory to open new fronts along Turkey‟s eastern frontier. The 
newly independent Armenia who emerged out with the collapse of the Soviet Union 
provided enough help for PKK to threaten northeastern Turkey. Greece encouraged 
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the PKK for more than a decade as the event of Öcalan‟s arrest revealed.220 In 
addition to these outsiders who shared a historical hostility with Turkey, the Western 
countries have turned a blind eye to the illegal acts of PKK in their territories, if not 
direct support to the PKK. 
However, the helps to PKK from outsiders have been decreasing owing to 
the various factors; the efforts of Turkey, the wide spread of terror image about PKK 
in the international society and the shared threat perception of neighboring countries 
against the de facto Kurdistan region after the invasion of Iraq by the U.S. For 
example, Syria‟s support to the PKK has been decreased by the warning of Turkish 
military with the warm political ties and bilateral trade. Even Iran who tolerated 
rather than actively supported the PKK during the 1990s has forbidden its activities 
in her territory due to its own Kurdish insurgency.
221
 In May 2002, EU declared the 
PKK who renamed KADEK and then Kongra-Gel as the terrorist group. In practice, 
Dutch security forces closed down the PKK training camps where had conducted 
terror attacks in Turkey, arresting 29 PKK terrorists. Also, many broadcastings
222
 
sympathetic to the PKK were shut down in Germany although still several EU 
countries have continued to tolerate the PKK and its fronts.
223
 Moreover, even 
though the American reluctance to confront the PKK has intensified distrust among 
Turkey‟s policymakers, she has declared the PKK as the terrorist groups with the 
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inclusion of PKK into the list of terrorist groups in 2004. Since the invasion of Iraq 
by the U.S., many neighboring countries that supported the PKK have started to 
share the common threat perceptions from the Kurdish question like Turkey. The 
emergence of the autonomous Kurdish government in northern Iraq suggested the 
neighboring countries that include many Kurds that Kurdish question can not be 
limited only on the Turkish concern.  
In order to predict whether Turkey can achieve the elimination of PKK in 
northern Iraq, we should consider the roles of the U.S. and Iraqi Kurdish groups. As 
25 cross border operations has illustrated, unless Turkey cooperates with the U.S. 
and more importantly KRG, military incursions into northern Iraq are likely to give 
only short-term damage to the PKK.  
           Meanwhile, there are no long term alliances or hostilities in northern Iraq. 
The relations between the Kurdish groups in the region have been affected by all 
internal as well as external actors. In line with the influences of all actors, all 
agreements and disagreements would be temporary and subject to change by 
developments in the region. For instance, shortly after the cross border operation of 
May 1983 by Turkish Armed Forces, the KDP and PKK signed a „PKK, KDP 
Cooperation Principles‟ in July of 1983. 224  However, KDP decided to end the 
alliance with the PKK due to the disagreement with Ö calan and the press of Turkish 
military on 1987.
225
 Instead of KDP, PUK would sign a similar alliance agreement 
with PKK because the complicated nature of the hostile relations between Barzani 
and Talabani played a big role in contacting with PKK. Also, Barzani invited the 
Saddam forces to expel the PUK from Erbil in 1996. When the battles between KDP 
and PUK broke out in 1994, Turkey allied with KDP because PUK allowed the PKK 
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to move freely under the PUK‟s control. Since then, Turkey has protected the KDP 
by the direct use of force against the PKK and the PUK. In the same process, the 
KDP, by its control of the Iraqi side of Habur customs gate at the border with 
Turkey, has had an important source of revenue, with the aid to the KDP in sizable 
amounts of armaments, money, trucks and technical equipments from Turkey. 
However, the relations between Turkey and KDP started to weaken from late 2002 
and KDP has attempted to form new policies in light of the cooperation with the 
policies of the U.S. In the case of the U.S., since the refusal of Turkey to the 
American request in March 2003, the U.S. has sought to maintain warmer 
relationship with KRG who helped to open a new northern front than with Turkey. 
However, by mid-October 2007, 40 Turkish soldiers killed by PKK terrors in a less 
than a month made the Turkish public and government to become unsustainable, 
leading the U.S. to share Turkish concerns a little. Such a shared Turkish concern 
rendered the U.S. to provide Turkey with actionable intelligence on PKK bases in 
northern Iraq under the condition that Turkish military actions would be limited.
226
 
In this sense, the complex interests of all actors made the Turkish policy-makers to 
understand the fact that winning the military aspect does not ensure success to 
eliminate the PKK in northern Iraq.  
 
4.3.3 Using Economic Leverage 
Along with the military operations against PKK, Turkey could affect in the 
region by using various methods in order to persuade both Kurdish parties (KDP and 
PUK) and the U.S. not to tolerate the presence of PKK in northern Iraq.
227
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One of the most effective policies is that Turkey would function as the role 
of joker in conflicts between all actors. Especially, in conflicts between KDP and 
PUK, Turkey took advantage of this division and acted as a broker of peace in order 
to make the Kurdish groups to be hostile to the PKK in northern Iraq. With the 
respect of the U.S., the strategic value of Turkey for the U.S. still remains valid 
because “Turkish model based on the secularism and democracy can provide the U.S. 
with the good evidence of Greater Middle East Project (GMEP). Also, the strategic 
value of Turkey during the cold war has not been removed due to the presence of the 
powerful Russia.”228 These strategic values of Turkey can not be ignored by the U.S. 
easily.  
On the other hand, Turkey can also use the economic leverage in order to 
make it clear to all the major players in northern Iraq that Iraq‟s territorial integrity, 
the status of Kirkuk, Turkmen and PKK terrorism need to be resolved in manner that 
addresses Turkish security concerns. Habur Gate is one of the key elements to 
control the KDP because the customs revenues of the KDP decreased dramatically 
when disputes arose between the KDP and Turkey.
229
 Given that KRG does not have 
any effective outside route because of the limited geographical position except to the 
Habur Gate, Turkey can gain the leverage to project their power into northern 
Iraq.
230
 After Gulf War II, the border gate system became the most important source 
of income for Kurdish groups, whereby they gained 300 million USD in permits for 
                                                                                                                                          
Turkey, the Turkish military and Special Forces presence and cross border operation. For a detail 
information, see Ekrem, “Türkiye‟nin Kuzey Irak Perspektifi ve Hareket Alanı(Turkey‟s Northern 
Iraq Perspective and Areas of Movement),” Stratejik Analiz, June 2007. 
228
 Burak B. Ö zpek, “Hatay ve Kıbrıs Olayları Bağlamında Kerkük Değerlendirmesi(The evaluation 
of applying events of Hatay and Cyprus into the Kirkuk),” Global Strateji, Vol. 9, Spring 2007, 
pp.231-232. 
229
 Cemalettin Taşkıran, “Kuzey Irak Türkmenler ve Dış Politikamız(The Turkmen in Northern Iraq 
and Our Foreign Policies),” Global Strateji, Vol. 9, Spring 2007, p.58. 
230
 Suphi Saatçı, 2007, op cit., p.34. 
 79 
the entry of Turkish trucks to northern Iraq.
231
 We should keep in mind that to 
maintain an open border, Iraqi Kurds established security agreements with the 
Turkish government which included shared efforts to search out terrorists from the 
PKK. An offer similar to this was made by the former „Coordinator for the Fight 
against Terrorism‟, General Edip Başer as follows; 
On the Turkish side, besides a military intervention to northern Iraq, there are 
other alternatives we can look at. For example, if we were to close the Habur 
border gate for a few days this would mean a serious warning for them (KRG 
and furthermore the U.S.). If we stop giving them electricity and cut the flow 
of oil, they will understand the seriousness of the situation. Of course such 
actions will hurt us economically as well. But everyone has to be 
understanding if such a decision were to be made. If need be, the state should 
bear the burden of these actions.
232
   
 
There has been recent discussion of closing this gate down and opening 
another border gate that passes through Turkmen territory at Ovaköy.
233
 Although 
this discussion lay on the table because of the possible attack of KDP to Turkmen, if 
another gate would be opened in Turkmen area, only discussion aroused the strong 
reaction from KDP. As illustrated the event of KDP using force against PUK to 
secure the border gate revenue in 2006, the issue of Habur Gate could be a critical 
methods to maintain the influence on the Kurdish groups. Also, the warning about 
closing down of Habur Gate to the U.S. can be method to make the U.S. to take 
active measures against PKK, considering that a lot of logistic materials have passed 
through the Habur Gate.  
In addition to the Habur Gate, the KDP and PUK have been deeply dependent 
on the Turkish goods including foods, materials and so on. For example, Turkey has 
given the KDP and PUK to some materials including foods and military weapons in 
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return for their extents of efforts to attack the PKK in northern Iraq.
234
 More recently, 
a MP of the opposition party in Turkey, Republican People‟s Party (CHP), Erdal 
Karademir bitterly criticized the policies of AKP about Iraqi Kurds in terms of the 
providing of electricity. He stated: 
The electricity needs of PKK camps in northern Iraq are provided by Turkey. 
And if this were not enough, the electricity that is sold to the Turkish people 
for 9.5 cent is sold to the Kurds for 6.7 cents. The money lost in the process is 
being subsidized by the Turkish Treasury. The AKP government and the 
Turkish Energy Sector Arrangement Committee gave special permission to a 
company by the name of Black Sea Whole Sale Electricity Ltd (KARTET) to 
export electricity to Iraq. KARTET is the only private company in Turkish 
which has permission to export electricity.
235
  
 
 Consequently, the economic prosperity that the KRG enjoys today has a lot of 
to do with Turkish assistance. As stated previously, Turkey has a power to use the 
reliance of KRG upon its assistance in order to attain the result favorable to Turkey 
such as putting a stop to the presence of the PKK in northern Iraq. In other words, the 
warning to close down the Habur Gate, to open new gate in Turkmen territory and to 
cut off the electricity will be counted as the serious stick by KRG. Also, the large 
American dependency on Turkey in terms of the logistic route can be the leverage to 
apply pressure on sensitive subject such as the PKK.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE REGIONAL INSTABILITY IN THE GEOSTRATEGICAL 
CONTEXT 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 As Abdullah Gül, the current President of Turkey has noted, “for Turkey, the 
situation of Iraq and the tasks we undertake there is not just simply another item on 
the global agenda. Iraq is our close neighbor and its future is inter-linked with the 
stability of the region.”236 Abdullah Gül‟s comment implies that the geo-strategic 
significance of northern Iraq is far more profound for Turkey than for other states 
because Turkey is simultaneously located not only in the part of the Middle Eastern 
regional political system but also in the part of Europe. To the extent that the 
situation in Iraq brings the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in northern 
Iraq into the agenda, it reactivates the “Sevres Syndrome” because of the potential 
spill-over effects of ethnic strife on Turkish southeastern territory mainly composed 
of the Kurds.  
Meanwhile, the stability of the Middle Eastern security deeply relies upon 
the future of Iraq who has included various ethnic groups such as Arabs (Sunni and 
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Shiite), Kurds, Turkmen and so on. The proposition that the future of Iraqi Kurds in 
northern Iraq will be the future of the Middle East is fairly reasonable and well-
grounded. The possible emergence of Kurdish state would involve not merely the 
disintegration of the state of Iraq as it existed since 1920 but also a radical overhaul 
of the geopolitical map of the Middle East and Gulf region that prevailed in the 
twentieth century. According to Mustafa Kibaroğlu, “if the Kurds should claim for 
their independent state, a mosaic of different ethnic and religious groups who have 
lived in one state may follow the case of Kurds that may render the whole Middle 
East into a political chaos.”237 Namely, the idea of the independent Kurdish state in 
northern Iraq would produce a domino effect on Kurdish secessionism in the 
countries such as Turkey, Syria and Iran who include many Kurds. Because, the 
logical ultimate goal of Iraqi Kurds who has tried to establish the Kurdish state in 
northern Iraq would be the union of Kurds disseminated in various countries.
238
 
As another factor to cause the conflict in the Middle East, considering the 
fears of Arabs and Iranians that Iraqi Kurds supported by the U.S. and Israel in 
northern Iraq can be the spokesperson of the West in the Middle East, the northern 
Iraq would be likely to be changed to the second Gaza Strip. In particular, both Syria 
and Iran who include the significantly high population rate of Kurds like Turkey
239
 
can be left to the danger to be challenged the territorial integrity by the autonomous 
Kurdish region supported by the U.S. and Israel in northern Iraq. On the contrary to 
both Syria and Iran, the U.S. and Israel who do not have any reliable allies in the 
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Middle East have regarded the Kurdish groups who have controlled the northern Iraq 
as the regional-political actor in terms of geostrategic aspect, if not perfect ally for 
the West until now.  
In addition to the complex as well as conflictive interests of regional powers 
about the developments of northern Iraq, the external powers, especially great 
powers including the U.S., Russia, EU and China have sought to project their powers 
into northern Iraq. The conflictive interests of great powers about northern Iraq have 
accelerated the instability as well as instigated political unrest in the Middle East. 
In short, the possible emergence of Kurdish state in northern Iraq will leave 
the negative legacy to the Middle East like the case of Israel. Under the high 
likelihood that various ethnic groups can attempt to achieve the autonomous status 
like the Kurds, that can lead to the domino-effect in the region. To be sure, such a 
tragic scenario would be possible if conflictive interests of both regional and external 
powers could affect on the regional stability negatively. Consequently, these weak 
territories will become a battlefield for regional and external powers. Also, the chaos 
in these inevitably weak and porous territories will act as safe heavens for terrorist 
groups which will probably act as proxies of their allies as the PKK and Ansar 
terrorist groups have acted in northern Iraq as their field of activities.
240
 Moreover, 
taking consideration into the fact that northern Iraq has the rich oil in terms of the 
energy security, no one can be certain that the external great powers and regional 
powers will refrain from attempting to influence the unfolding events to their 
unilateral advantage. 
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5.2 The Conflictive Interests of Regional Powers about Northern Iraq 
Iraq is the miniature of the Middle East in terms of the composition of ethnic 
groups. The Kurds in northern Iraq have links with the Kurds in Turkey, Iran and 
Syria; the Shiite Iraqi Arabs living mainly in the south area of Iraq are deeply 
connected to Arab and non-Arab Shiites in Iran, Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia; 
the Sunni Iraqi Arabs living in the middle area of Iraq have relations with the Suuni 
Arabs in Syria and Jordan and Islamic movements in the Arab world; and the 
Turkmen have links with Turkey. Therefore, all neighboring countries have their 
own national interests in Iraq while their different policies pursued by Iraqi 
neighbors will inevitably cause the conflict in the region. To make matters worse, the 
common efforts to try to protect the territorial integrity of Iraq shared by Turkey, 
Arab states and Iran do not give the green light to Israel surrounded by potential 
enemies. Also, Arabs, Turks and Iranians have recognized the American words that 
she has tried to restore the stability in Iraq in order to avoid the menace of civil war 
as the propaganda clichés. Such a fear of regional states has a great persuasive power 
in a sense that the U.S. has sought to the “divide and rule” policy based on the ethnic 
groups about Iraq as well as the preferable policies for the Iraqi Kurds.  
 
5.2.1 The Concerns of Arab States 
The basic concerns of Arab states about the developments of northern Iraq 
come from the fall of the Saddam regime who maintained the territorial unitary in 
Iraq. In addition, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries would not admit the 
establishment of a second Shiite or Shiite-dominated state in the Middle East plus 
Iran. These countries are also concerned about the Arab Shiite in southern Iraq, given 
that they have significant Shiite minorities in their nearby provinces. Moreover, some 
 85 
Arab states see Iraq as part of Arab nation and oppose the establishment of a Kurdish 
state in Iraq as well as the policy of turning Iraq into a Shiite country which could 
easily fall under the direct or indirect influence of Iran. However, the American 
occupation to Iraq consolidated ethnic and religious divisions, while “divide and 
rule” became a useful instrument to govern the conflictive Iraq. Therefore, many 
Arabs started to believe that the U.S. aimed to break up Iraq into the three ethnic and 
religious groups by supporting the independent Kurdish state.
241
 The preferable 
policies toward Kurds of the U.S. since the operation of No-Fly-Zone made these 
concerns of Arab states not to be groundless. Many in the Arab media even have 
criticized the Kurdish peshmerga for being American mercenaries trying to subdue 
the Arab people. Arab states‟ interests in Iraq were emphasized often by the Arab 
leaders. During the first official visit of Syrian President Bashar al-Asa to Turkey 
early in January 2004, he stressed, “Turkey and Syria were not only against a 
Kurdish state in the region but any state that could break the integrity of Iraq.”242 
When the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak visited to Ankara in February 2004, he 
stated that “Egypt should together against any effort with Turkey that aimed to harm 
the integrity of Iraq.”243  
One of the most important initiatives related to Iraq at the regional level has 
been appeared in Iraq‟s Neighbors Meeting. From the opening of Iraq‟s Neighbors 
Meeting
244
 that started on January 23, 2003 when the invasion against Iraq by the 
U.S. was looming to today, the neighboring countries of Iraq have still emphasized 
that the territorial unitary of Iraq should be maintained and the regional stability 
should be sustained.  
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Admittedly, the fundamental background of Arab states about developments 
of northern Iraq roots in the deep distrust of the biased Western policies, especially 
the U.S., with the historical experiences of betrayal by the Imperial powers. Arab 
states have doubted the word of the U.S. to the neighboring states of Iraq that she has 
tried to establish the democratic state in Iraq within the structure of the societal, 
political and territorial integrity. Arab states‟ distrust in the U.S. words is not 
groundless in a sense that a declared opposition of the U.S. to the break-up of the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia did not prevent the collapse of these states. 
 One of Arab states who are most significantly wary about the developments 
of northern Iraq is the Syria who has been hostile to Israel since 1948 when Israel 
was founded by the support of the West. Also, Syria who shares long borders with 
Iraq and includes approximately 1.5-2 million Kurds who have lived in near northern 
Iraq would feel the danger of the territorial integrity. Although Syria has a short 
borderline with Israel, the emergence of autonomous Kurdish region supported by 
Israel has increased the threat perception of Syria. The fact that the relations among 
Turkey, Iran and Syria have significantly improved in recent years reflects the 
increasing concern of Syria despite the strained relations in the 1980s and 1990s due 
to her support to PKK.
245
 
 
5.2.2 The Concerns of Iran 
As an influential regional power, Iran, no less than other states in the regional 
and global system, has tried to produce the hegemonic power. At present, the future 
of northern Iraq deeply related to the one of Iraq can challenge the vital interests of 
Iran in multidimensional aspects; national, regional and global position. In this way, 
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understanding the Iran‟s current concerns about Iraq is much more complex than the 
Arab states. First of all, at the national level, Iranian concern derives from the 
emerging factionalism which can instigate the Kurds who have lived in Iran. The fact 
that Iran who contains the second-largest number of Kurds in the world, followed by 
Turkey, has beaten the Kurdish national movement continuously
246
 is to illustrate 
Iranian concern about northern Iraq. In addition to the possible disintegration of Iraq, 
the plausible coalition of the KRG with other regional states, particularly Israel, can 
be the main threat to Iran.  
On the other hand, another Iranian interest is deeply connected with the 
position of Shiites in the Iraqi political system. Although Iraqi Shittes seized the 
important positions in Iraqi politics, a struggle for supremacy power within the 
factions of Iraqi Shiite
247
 can also create the tension in the domain of Iranian foreign 
policy.
248
 At the regional sphere, the new birth of Iraq demands the revision of the 
regional security structure in the Middle East. It would be more likely for such a 
change to lead to the instability rather than the stability in the Middle East. From the 
international perspective, one of the most important Iranian concerns stems from the 
feelings of encirclement created by the U.S. force presence in Iraq. Not only a 
continuous hostility between the U.S. and Iran but also a recent confrontation of 
them about Iranian nuclear ambition have played vital roles in worsening the 
relationship between the U.S. and Iran. In other words, to Iran, the presence of the 
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U.S. force in Iraq can threaten to the Iran security immediately. “Even if Iran has 
taken a moderate stances to recent Iraqi politics, Iranian politicians have tried to 
establish a close relationship with the Iraqi Shiites groups in order to resist the 
uncompromising the U.S. demands to her.”249 
 
            5.2.3 The Interests of Israel 
 Israel completely surrounded by potential enemies, Arab states, is small in 
size and has no strategic depth.
250
 Turkey and Israel maintained the perfectly 
cooperative relationship throughout the 1990s in that both countries could satisfy 
desires of each other; Israel needed the space, the strategic depth, whereas Turkey 
needed the advanced technology of Israel in terms of military. However, such a 
warm relationship becomes fluctuated with the respect of the positions of northern 
Iraq. That is, according to Mustafa Kibaroğlu, “the possible emergence of the 
Kurdistan state would be the worst scenario for Turkey whereas it would be 
beneficial to Israel.”251 From the perspective of Israel, one of the most overwhelming 
national concerns would be Iran who has attempted to develop the nuclear weapons 
recently despite the pressures from the U.S. It is absolutely true that the geostrategic 
position of northern Iraq would provide Israel the most effective way to monitor the 
Iranian nuclear effort, furthermore, threats posed by countries like Pakistan and 
Central Asian states that are coming to the radical Islamic states.
252
Another reason 
why Israel has given the importance to northern Iraq stems from the fear that Turkey, 
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the traditional ally of Israel in the unstable Middle East, is becoming an anti-Israel 
country. For instance, publicly criticizing the Israel‟s tragic suppression against 
Palestinian, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Turkish Prime Minister, said “Israel security 
forces retaliated to suicide bombings by committing state terror against innocent 
Palestinians.”253 
  On the other hand, another threat perception of Israel would be to depend on 
outside sources of energy. To protect the secure oil resources from the non-Arab 
states would be problem that Israel has confronted since her foundation in 1948. The 
fact that northern Iraq controlled by non-Arab people, namely Kurds, retains 
enormous natural resources is the attractive element to encourage Israel to give the 
financial and military support to the Kurds. According to the BBC broadcasting, 
“Israelis trained Kurdish troops in Iraq more than one year ago, although both Israeli 
government and Iraqi one denied this broadcasting.”254 Considering the numerous 
Israeli media about the similarity between Israel and the Kurdish-state-in-being with 
both surrounded and besieged by hostile states. Israel will not abandon to support the 
Iraqi Kurdish groups with their long-term strategic thinking based on the 
fragmentation of the Middle East into ethno-religious states in order to weaken the 
consolidation of the Arab states hostile to the Israel.  
 
5.3 The Conflictive Interests of External Powers about Iraq 
 In addition to the deeply different interests of the regional powers adjacent to 
Iraq, the conflictive interests of External powers as well about Iraq have played a 
vital role in leading to the instability in the Middle East. From beginning to end of 
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the Iraqi war, Russia has opposed to the U.S. policies in Iraq, regulating the U.S. 
actions as the illegitimate ones. More broadly, Russia has thought that the American 
intention to invade the Iraq is to lay a foundation for engaging into the Caspian, 
Caucasus and Central Asia in order to ensure the energy resources and control the 
expansion of Russia and China.  
On the other hand, although EU and China who do not have enough military 
capability competitive to the U.S. have not opposed to the U.S. as much as Russia 
publicly, their hidden attitude to the U.S. is also negatively. Such conflictive 
interests of Great Powers can bring into the stability rather than the instability in Iraq, 
more broadly in the Middle East.   
 
5.3.1 The Interests of the U.S. 
No one can deny the proposition that the political actor who can the most 
strongly effect on the fate of northern Iraq is the U.S., the only superpower in the 
world. The U.S. policies about Iraq are fundamentally based on strategies about the 
Middle East. The basic aims of the U.S. in the Middle East are as follows: 
 To ensure the oil and energy resource in the region 
 To protect Israel from the potential enemies and to weaken the strength of 
potential enemies such as Syria and Iran who can threaten the security of 
Israel 
 To weaken the movement of radical Islamism or Islamic fundamentalism 
 To remove weapons of mass destruction (WMD) including chemical, 
biological and nuclear weapons in the region
255
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However, after 9.11 terror, the U.S. added new aims that should be achieved 
in the Middle East; to democratize all regimes including authoritarian and Islamic 
nations and to keep her hand on the Middle East and Central Asia firmly, at the same 
time to control all peripheries of China and Iran during the process being undertaken 
operations.
256
   
Shortly after the victory against Afghanistan who has supplied the al-Qaeda 
with the military base and financial support, the U.S. indicated the Iraq as the second 
target on the ground that Iraq had the close connection with al-Qaeda and possessed 
the WMD which could target to the U.S. However, when George W. Bush 
administration came to the power, they were critical of the previous Iraqi policies 
sought by Bill Clinton government. In fact, “the September 11 attack only made the 
invasion against Iraq earlier and helped the administration to frame within the 
context of a broader war on terrorism.”257 Namely, in order to achieve the aims 
mentioned above, the U.S. chose the Iraq as the starting-point of the strategic 
achievement in the Middle East. In addition to the Middle East, the U.S. could 
secure a bridgehead to control the Gulf, Caucasus and Central Asia by controlling 
the Iraq. In short, in the context of the GMEP, the U.S. has regarded the Iraq as the 
strategic point for pressuring the Islamic system or at least for neutralizing its anti-
American policies.
258
 
As the prerequisites of achieving the strategic goals mentioned above, the 
U.S. should form a strong secular central government who can lead to the stability in 
Iraq. In the process of achieving the stability in Iraq, the pro-Kurdish element in the 
U.S. policy was not inevitable but rather arose from failures and disappointments 
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with other forces. The American relative isolation in its Iraqi policies, facing 
hostility from many Sunni, some Shiite Iraqi, Turkey, Iran, a number of Arab states, 
a significant part of EU and Russia, has made her to be dependent on 70,000 pro-
coalition Kurdish peshmerga.
259
 To make matters complicated, being developed into 
more confused situation of Iraq, the initial calculation of the U.S. that Iraqi people 
suppressed by the tyrant, Saddam, will welcome the U.S. forces has been cracked 
down by the continuous insurgencies. Due to the strong opposition to the Iraqi 
policies of Bush administration within the U.S. domestic politics as well as the 
growing military spending, the U.S. was necessary to find the reliable ally who 
could alleviate the burden of the U.S. in Iraq. In sum, being confronted with triple 
pressures from the U.S. domestic, international and Iraqi resistance, Bush 
administration has sought to the preferable policies to Iraqi Kurds regardless of the 
oppositions of other states in the process of Iraqi reconstruction, more broadly, in the 
process of the reorganization of regional security structure in order to weaken the 
pro-Iranian Islamists and protect the Israel..  
However, we should need to understand the American policies about Iraqi 
Kurds in terms of the long-term strategic aims mentioned above. The fact that the 
U.S. has supported to Iraqi Kurdish groups in Iraq and Iran whereas she has not 
taken any actions against the PKK can be interpreted in the context of the American 
strategy to coincide with the long-term Israeli strategic thinking based on the 
fragmentation of the Middle East into ethno-religious states.  
As concrete examples, under the support of the U.S., the Iraqi transnational 
constitution did grant many rights to the Kurds such as the recognition of the KRG, 
the formation of a federal system for Iraq on the basis of geographic and historic 
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realities, the Kurds‟ right to veto and a proposal for a solution to the issue of Kirkuk. 
Also, in May 2005 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice went to the Kurdistan in a 
first visit to Iraq before Baghdad for the purpose of bolstering the Kurdish leader‟s 
position in Iraqi political system. Then, in November 2005, Barzani officially was 
invited to the White House as the president of the KRG. During that visit, he took 
the assurance that “the U.S. would accord the Kurds special status in Iraq.”260   
Furthermore, the warm American policies about the Iraqi Kurdish groups 
which came from the long-term U.S. policies about the Middle East had been 
intensified a little with the refusal of Turkey to the U.S. request in March 2003. 
Since that time, the Iraqi Kurds suddenly were assumed to the American ally. The 
crack of alliance between the U.S. and Turkey clearly was reflected in the accident 
in July 2003 when the U.S. forces detained 11 Turkish soldiers in Sulaymaniya who 
had performed their duties in northern Iraq as mentioned in the second Chapter. The 
Sulaymaniya incident was recorded as the worst crisis of confidence in the U.S.-
Turkey relations since the creation of the NATO alliance.
261
 However, the limited 
relationship between the U.S. and Turkey about Iraqi situation including the 
American good attitude to the Iraqi Kurdish groups stems from the long-term 
American strategy rather than Turkish unwillingness to support the U.S. invasion 
about Iraq.  
In short, such American policies about the Kurds has led to the serious 
disorder on a ground that most regional powers except Israel as well as great powers 
are objected to the American policies.  
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5.3.2 The Interests of Russia 
Vladimire Putin, the President of Russia, strongly criticized that “the U.S. 
have attempted to create the unipolar system in the world and that the U.S. unilateral 
actions have given current world system to serious harm in Munich Security 
Conference in February, 2007.”262  Putin‟s speech evoked a large echo to some 
extent that some experts evaluated as the starting of the new cold war. Such a speech 
well reflects the Russian aims and concerns as well. Seeking to regain the past 
hegemonic position equal to the U.S. during the bio-polar system, Russia has been 
wary about the power projection of the U.S. into the region where Russia has been 
dominant. Also, she was very critical of the U.S. policies about Iraq by saying that 
“unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problem, 
moreover, they (the U.S.) have caused new human tragedies and created new centers 
of tension.”263 Although the U.S. and Russia can find the common ground in the 
“war on terror,” religious extremisms and the prevention of the spread of WMD with 
the respect of the Iraqi problem, Moscow has been indeed consistent through the 
pre-Iraq war, war and post-war periods in her opposition to the U.S.‟s use of force 
against Iraq.
264
  
From the strategic perspective of Russia, the Iraq can be regarded as the 
“buffer-zone by Russia in maintaining their dominant position in the Caspian, 
Caucasus and Central Asia” including a lot of energy resources. 265  That is, the 
occupation of Iraq by the U.S. can threaten the dominant position of Russia in the 
region she has maintained dominance. The American establishment of a close 
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relationship with Central Asian states in terms of military in order to control the 
expansion of Russia and China under the name of the “war on terror” as well as to 
ensure a lot of energy of Central Asia also deeply has caused to a harsh Russian 
reaction to Iraqi policies of the U.S. The GMEP to which Bush administration has 
sought can affect the Central Asian situation owing to the geopolitical as well as the 
cultural closeness. In other words, the instability of the Middle East can be 
connected with that of Central Asia. Therefore, Russia as the predominant power 
and the great power with the most at stake in the Central Asia, Caucasus and 
Caspian until now wants stability in Iraq. 
 
5.3.3 The Interests of EU 
EU has not had any united voice about the U.S. policies about Iraq because 
the four major countries of EU produced the different reactions about the invasion of 
the U.S. against Iraq initially in 2003.
266
 Although EU agrees with the basic idea of 
democratization in Iraq that the U.S. suggested as the cause of the Iraqi war, there 
are U.S.-EU disagreements on the rationale and methods of the democratization in 
the Iraq.  
Although roles EU can play in the Iraq, furthermore, the Middle East are 
mostly non-military until now, still without credible military force with 
peacekeeping and crisis management capacity, the EU has realized that she will 
hardly be able to attain various advantages such as economic (oil), political 
(democratization) and security (threat prevention) strategies in the region.
267
 For 
example, shortly following the Iraqi invasion, the participations of EU countries 
exception the U.K. have been limited in terms of funding and aid for the 
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reconstruction of Iraq.
268
 Regarding trade with Iraq, the U.S. is the main partner with 
total 40.7 % whereas the EU possesses the 20.7% of total amount traded during 
post-Iraqi war. Furthermore, the EU is long way to regain the level of pre-1991 year 
in terms of oil supply from Iraq.
269
 As the economic trade shows us, the key factor to 
restrict the economic restoration of EU with Iraq would be the opposition of 
principal European countries to the Iraqi invasion.  
But, in the aspect of military, the EU will not be able to achieve a power 
projection force capable of fighting a major contingency in Iraq in the near future 
because it is currently falling inferior to the technological superiority of the U.S. 
military capabilities. Therefore, the EU‟s key military roles in the Middle East will 
most likely to be assisting individual friendly states in dealing with internal and low-
level conflicts, helping in peacemaking and nation-building exercises and assisting 
the U.S. in the formation of various coalitions where the US would find regional 
alliances with Middle Eastern states more beneficiary in dealing with the region‟s 
problems.
270
 However, the tension between the U.S. and EU about the Iraqi policies 
would be so clear that it would be doubtable that EU will be the active supporter of 
the U.S. in the Iraq, more broadly, in the Middle East.  
 
5.3.4 The Interests of China 
No one can easily object to the suggestion that in feasible future the main 
competitor of the U.S. will be the China who rapidly has expanded their powers into 
                                                 
268
 The total of $33 bilion was contributed for the reconstruction of Iraq. Of this sum, fully $20 billion 
came from the U.S., $5 billion was donated by Japan and $1 billion by the U.K..In the case of France, 
the main opponent to invade Iraq declined to make any contribution. In total, $1 billion was donated 
by the EU countries. For detail information, see, Jonathan Spyer, “Europe and Iraqi: Test Case for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy,” MERIA journal, Vol. 11, No. 2, June 2007. 
269
 Jonathan Spyer, “Europe and Iraqi: Test Case for the Common Foreign and Security Policy,” 
MERIA journal, Vol. 11, No. 2, June 2007, p.102. 
270
 Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Role of Europe in the Middle East: An American Perspective,” 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Prepared for the IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, 
March 11, 2002.  
 97 
all areas including economy, military, diplomacy and so on. However, Beijing can 
not help but acknowledge that the military power of the U.S. and its allies is a 
generation ahead of that of China. Far from posing any genuine military challenge to 
the U.S. at least in conventional terms, “the China will not make any direct 
confrontation with the U.S. for future several decades.”271 With an overwhelming 
desire to avoid a direct confrontation with the lone superpower, some Chinese 
nonetheless have predicted a collision course of between the U.S. and China in the 
not very distant over, primarily, the issue of Taiwan.
272
 As Iraq represented the pre-
emptive doctrine of Bush administration,
273
 Beijing has been concerned that the 
unilateral military action of the U.S. like the case of Iraq will be broken out in the 
case of Taiwan or North Korea under the situation where Chinese military power 
was low level compared to that of the U.S. Given the present aggressive U.S. foreign 
policies taken place in many countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
establishment of missile and military bases in Poland, Georgia and the attempt to 
consolidate the military and economic relationship with the Central Asian countries 
adjacent to the China, it would be possibly more likely that the U.S. will provoke 
China. And Chinese leadership also has been wary that her long-term acquiescence 
in American expansionism would give negative effects on China‟s relations with the 
Arab and Islamic world.
274
 
Perceived as the disadvantageous position, the main goal of Chinese interests 
in the Iraq is to ensure the stable oil supplies, avoiding the direct military 
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confrontation with the U.S.
275
 However, the U.S. occupation of Iraq and the ensuing 
instability placed the Chinese expectation to hold in terms of the acquisition of Iraqi 
oil.
276
 Unlike Russia, although china has not criticized the Iraqi policies of the U.S. 
publicly, the hidden attitude of China toward the U.S. in terms of Iraq problem is the 
objection.   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 Evaluation of Turkish Concerns about Northern Iraq 
If we estimate Turkish concerns about northern Iraq from various 
perspectives, in today‟s Turkey, the issue of an independent Kurdish state in the 
northern Iraq is perceived as a matter of survival.  
The Turkish basic thought that current northern Iraqi situation may not be 
occurred, if the British would not violate the provisions of Mudros Armistice, is the 
historical driving-force for Turkey to engage in northern Iraq. Pursuant to the Ankara 
Agreement that decided the Mosul issue ultimately, Turkey conceded the Mosul to 
the Iraqi government under the mandate of British, not to the particular ethnic group, 
Kurds. The argument of Hasan Tunç that “if the Ankara agreement would be 
remained invalid because of the disintegration of Iraq, Mosul province should be 
returned to the original possessor, Turkey, by the guidance of international law”277 
has a strong persuasive power.  
Turkmen who has the same ties with Turks in terms of origin, culture and 
language has lived under the strong suppressions by other ethnic groups supported by 
Iraqi ruling powers and Kurds. The exposure of Turkmen to massacres in 1924, 1946, 
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1959 and 1991 by Arabs and Kurds has demanded Turks to protect their brothers 
who have not gained any political and cultural rights in the Iraqi political system 
from the past to now. The just and great cause to invade into Iraq that the U.S. 
suggested, the democratization, has not been applied to Turkmen. Under the newly 
regulated constitution by the federal Iraqi government supported by the U.S., the 
political rights of Turkmen was ignored again like other constitutions established by 
past Iraqi regimes. Furthermore, Kirkuk, the original Turkmen city, has been targeted 
by Kurdish groups who want to involve this city to the region of KRG through the 
referendum expected in 2008 by changing the demographical structure. It is quite 
natural that Turks should try to pursuit the foreign polices to protect the rights of 
Turkmen in northern Iraq along with human rights.  
From the political perspective, although there are many positive changes of 
Turkish politics about the Kurdish question, the PKK, terrorist group, has not 
abandoned the military struggle against Turkey. Their declaration about the cease-
fire against Turkish security forces was revealed as the one of the tactics to secure 
the recharging time and military resources in order to attack Turkey again. Also, 
using the power-vacuum taken place in northern Iraq due to the No-Fly-Zone 
Operation, the PKK has strengthened their positions in northern Iraq with the support 
from the Kurdish groups and the deep sympathy to them by Iraqi Kurds as well as 
under the tolerance of the U.S. While the PKK has succeeded in intensifying their 
powers in northern Iraq, Turkey has faced with various obstacles to eliminate the 
PKK because of the unwillingness of the U.S. and Kurdish groups to attack them.  
Meanwhile, the complex interest calculations of all actors including regional 
and external powers about the future situation of northern Iraq will be likely to lead 
the unstable security structure in the Middle East. In the future, the advent of the de 
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jure Kurdish government that overcomes the de facto level in northern Iraq in today 
can drive the whole Middle East into the bloody conflicts. In other words, 
considering the mosaic composition of ethnic groups in the region, the advent of the 
Kurdish state will encourage other ethnics to attempt to achieve the same status equal 
to Kurds. Also, neighboring countries such as Turkey, Iran and Syria who contain 
many Kurds has been wary that KRG not only strongly financed by the trade of oil 
with other states but also supported by the U.S. and Israel serves as a center to attract 
the restive Kurds in neighboring countries. Otherwise, KRG might lend them to 
direct support by forming the sympathetic feeling of international society for the idea 
of wider Kurdish national self-determination, possibly leading ultimately to a 
sovereign Kurdish state that can include the Kurds scattered in three countries.  
In addition to the deeply contrasted interests about northern Iraq among 
regional powers, the conflictive interests of external powers can contribute to 
obstruct the stability in the Iraq, furthermore, the Middle East. The antagonistic 
relationships between the U.S. and Russia plus tacit oppositions of EU and China 
against the U.S. policies about Iraq also have played a vital role in leading to the 
instability in the Middle East.  
 
 Evaluation of Turkish Foreign Policies about Northern Iraq  
Turkish new activism on the Middle East is a significant departure from 
traditional Turkish foreign policies espoused by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder 
of the modern Turkish republic. His main guidance of Turkish foreign policy was 
that Turkey should limit its involvement in Middle East affairs. Turkey‟s recent 
focus on Middle East, however, does not mean that Turkey is about to turn its back 
on the West. The changes of Turkish foreign policies mainly have derived from the 
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structural changes in its security environment since the end of the Cold War; growing 
Kurdish separatism, sectarian violence in Iraq that could spill over, the rise of Iran 
and the increasing radical Islamic groups.  
Admittedly, there have been controversial debates about Turkish foreign 
policies about northern Iraq. Turkish supports to the U.S. operations such as No-Fly-
Zone sometimes were criticized by some scholars arguing that Turkey functioned as 
providing Iraqi Kurds, more broadly, the PKK terrorists with the safe heaven where 
would be the starting-point of current question in northern Iraq. However, by 
supporting the U.S. initiative, Turkey could carry out operations on northern Iraq 
against the PKK terror organization. If Poised Hammer/Operation Northern Watch 
were not supported, Turkey could face problems in the international community. 
Also, the Turkish refusal of the U.S. request to deploy the U.S. army in Turkish 
territory in March 2003 has been criticized by some scholars because the refusal has 
made Turkey to be placed on the sideline with the respect of Iraqi question by 
helping Kurdish leaders to gain the upper hand in northern Iraq vis-a-vis the Turkish 
government. As a result of Turkish refusal, red lines
278
 established February 2002 in 
an agreement between the U.S. and Turkey has been changed. However, Turkish 
decision to refuse the U.S. request was indispensible one because of various factors. 
Turkey had cooperated with the U.S. since the Gulf War amid lingering suspicions 
about its real intentions with the disappointment of Turkey about the U.S. who did 
not give any importance to Turkish national interests in northern Iraq. In terms of 
economy, estimates of Turkey‟s cumulative economic losses in the aftermath of the 
1991 Gulf War were between 40 and 60 billion dollars, including indirect costs.
279
 
There were similar concerns about the adverse economic impact of a new 
                                                 
278
 The red lines included that Mosul and Kirkuk would be occupied by the U.S. force, not by Krudish 
troops and that the U.S. would not permit the PKK/Kongra-Gel to gain strength in the region.  
279
 Meliha B. Antunişik, op cit., p.186. 
 103 
confrontation with Iraq on a Turkish economy already weakened by the 2001 
financial crisis. From the domestic viewpoint, the newly established party, AKP who 
received an impressive 35% of the votes in 2002 election did not ignore the 90% 
Turkish people who opposed the Iraqi war. It would be natural for AKP to see the 
trend of public sentiment in a sense that AKP‟s main strength derived from that 
public support.
280
 The Turkish military, the main supporter about the alliance with 
the U.S., was equally reluctant to take sole responsibility for an unpopular decision 
and apparently wanted to share it with other actors, especially political parties. On 
the other hand, if Turkey would involve in a war without international legitimacy, it 
might have negative effects on its relations with both EU and Middle Eastern 
countries. Therefore, from various aspects, the determinations of Turkey in 1991 
Gulf War and 2003 Iraq war can be evaluated as the best choice at that time as well 
as situation.  
 However, generally speaking, Turkish foreign policies have made a big 
mistake in dealing with Turkmen. In fact, Turkey did not have a specific foreign 
policy towards the Turkmen between 1921 when the Mosul was conceded to Iraq and 
1991 when the Gulf War was begun. Although activities of Turkey towards the 
Turkmen increased from 1991 to 1996, these activities remained limited, focusing on 
the cultural and education rights of Turkmen. After the Iraqi war of 2003, Turkey has 
demanded the same political, cultural and social rights for Turkmen as the other 
ethnic groups. The motivation for Turkey to begin to discover its previously 
forgotten Turkmen was based on a sense of crisis that the Iraqi Kurds were moving 
toward statehood as a counterbalance against the Iraqi Kurds.  
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Turkey should give support to Turkmen economic and cultural dimensions to 
make them a political and economical power in Iraq. Besides, the Turkmen are 
important for Turkey in terms of security reasons. The aim of Turkish policy is not to 
let the Kurdish state to be established, defending territorial and political integrity of 
Iraq. In order to achieve such a goal, Turkey should try to make the U.S. who has 
pursued policies in favor of Kurds rather than balanced policies among all the ethnic 
groups in northern Iraq to share the Turkish concerns about northern Iraq. If the 
wrong policies of the U.S. and misperceived by Kurds especially in Kirkuk where is 
called as little Iraq with its ethnic mixture (Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians and so 
on) will be sustained, the tension between ethnic groups may be transformed into the 
bloody conflicts among ethnic identities in Iraq.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
TEXT OF THE ARMISTICE CONCLUDED AT MUDROS 
 
 
 
 Sections included in the armistice project agreed at Versailles on October 6-8 
but omitted in the final armistice agreement are in italics. Sections not in the 
Versailles draft but added at Mudros are in capital letters. The order of the terms as 
agreed at Versailles was different from that communicated to Calthorpe at Mudros 
and given below, having been rearranged in order of importance by Wilson on 
October 21.  
1. Opening of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus and secure access to the Black 
Sea. Allied occupation of Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts.  
2. Positions of all minefields, torpedo tubes and other obstructions in 
Turkish waters to be indicated and assistance given to sweep or remove 
them as may be required.  
3. All available information as to mines in the Black Sea to be 
communicated.  
4. All Allied prisoners of war and Armenian interned persons and prisoners 
to be collected in Constantinople and Handed over unconditionally to the 
Allies.  
5. Immediate demobilization of the Turkish army except for such troops as 
are required for surveillance of frontiers and for the maintenance of 
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internal order. (Numbers of effectives and their dispositions to be 
determined later by the Allies AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE 
TURKISH GOVERNMENT.) 
6. Surrender of all war vessels in Turkish waters or in waters occupied by 
Turkey; these ships to be iterned at such Turkish port or ports as may be 
directed, EXCEPT SUCH SMALL VESSELS AS ARE REQUIRED FOR 
POLICE OR SIMILAR PURPOSES IN TURKISH TERRITORIAL 
WATERS.  
7. The Allies to have the right to occupy any strategic points IN THE 
EVENT OF A SITUATION ARISING WHICH THREATERNS THE 
SECURITY OF THE ALLIES.  
8. Free use by Allied ships of all ports and anchorages now in Turkish 
occupation and denial of their use to the enemy. SIMILAR 
CONDITIONS TO APPLY TO TURKISH MERCANTILE SHIPPING 
IN TURKISH WATERS FOR PURPOSES OF TRADE AND THE 
DEMOBILIZATION OF THE ARMY. 
9. Use of Constantinople as a naval base for the Allies and Use of all ship 
repair facilities at all Turkish ports and arsenals.  
10. Allied occupation of the Taurus Tunnel System. 
11. Immediate withdrawal of Turkish troops from North-west Persia and 
trans-Caucasia to behind the pre-war frontier HAS ALREADY BEEN 
ORDERED AND WILL BE CARRIED OUT. PART OF TRANS-
CAUCASIA HAS ALREADY BEEN ORDERED TO BE EVACUATED 
IF REQUIRED BY THE ALLIES AFTER THEY HAVE STUDIED THE 
SITUATION THERE.  
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12. Wireless telegraphy and cable stations to be controlled by the Allies, 
TURKISH GOVERNMENT MESSAGES EXCEPTED.  
13. Prohibition to destroy and naval, military or commercial material.  
14. Facilities to be given for the purchase of coal and oil-fuel and naval 
material from Turkish sources AFTER THE REQUIREMENT OF THE 
COUNTRY HAVE BEEN MET. 
NONE OF ABOVE TO BE EXPORTED.  
15. Allied Control Officers to be placed on all railways, including such 
portions of trans-Caucasian railways now under Turkish control, which 
must be placed at the free and complete disposal of the Allied authorities. 
DUE CONSIDERATION BEING GIVEN TO THE NEEDS OF THE 
POPULATION.  
This clause to include Allied occupation of Batum and Baku. TURKEY 
WILL RAISE NO OBJECTION TO THE OCCUPATION OF BAKU BY 
THE ALLIES.  
16. Surrender of all garrisons in Hejaz, Assir, Yemen, Syria, AND 
Mesopotamia Cilicia to the nearest Allied Commander or Arab 
representative; AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM 
CILICIA, EXCEPT THOSE NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN ORDER, AS 
WILL BE DETERMINED UNDER CLAUSE 5.  
17. Surrender of all Turkish officer in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica to the 
nearest Italian garrison. TURKEY AGREES TO STOP SUPPLIES AND 
COMMUNICATIONS WITH THOSE OFFICERS IF THEY DO NOT 
OBEY THE ORDER TO SURRENDER.  
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18. Surrender of all ports occupied in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, including 
Misurata, to the nearest Allied garrison.  
19. The handing over of All Germans and Austrians, naval military and 
civilian, to the nearest British or Allied Commander TO BE 
EVACUATED WITHIN ONE MONTH FROM TURKISH 
DOMINIONS; THOSE IN REMOTE DISTRICTS AS SOON AFTER 
AS MAY BE POSSIBLE.  
20. Compliance with such orders as may be conveyed for the disposal and 
disposition of the Turkish Army and its equipment, arms and ammunition, 
including transport OF THE EQUIPMENT, ARMS AND 
AMMUNITION, INCLUDING TRANSPORT, OF THAT PORTION OF 
THE TURKISH ARMY WHICH IS DEMOBILIZED UNDER CLAUSE   
21. Appointed of Allied officers to control Army supplies. AN ALLIED 
REPRESENTATIVE TO BE ATTACHED TO THE TURKISH 
MINISTRY OF SUPPLIES IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD ALLIED 
INTERESTS. THIS REPRESENTATIVE TO BE FURNISHED WITH 
ALL INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR THIS PURPOSE.  
22. Turkish prisoners to be kept at the disposal of the Allied Powers. THE 
RELEASE OF TURKISH CIVILIAN PRISONERS AND PRISONERS 
OVER MILITARY AGE TO BE CONSIDERED.  
23. Obligation on the part of Turkey to cease all relations with the Central 
Powers.  
24. In case of disorder in the Armenian Vilayet, the Allies reserve to 
themselves the right to occupy any part of them.  
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     b. The occupation of Sis, Hajin, Zeytin and Aintab in accordance with 
the 7th, 10th, and 15th articles.  
25. HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE ALLIES AND TURKEY SHALL 
CEASE FROM NOON, LOCAL TIME, ON THURSDAY, 31st October, 
1918.  
 
                                                                                         Signed in duplicate on 
board His Britainic 
Majesty‟s Ship 
„Agreement‟ at Port 
Mudros, Lemnos, the 
30th October, 1918.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : Gwynne Cyer, “The Turkish Armistice of 1918 :  A Lost Opportunity : The 
Armistice Negotiations of Mudros, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 8, No : 2, 1972.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND IRAQ AND TURKEY 
REGARDING THE SETTLEMENT OF THE FRONTIER BETWEEN 
TURKEY AND IRAQ 
 
Signed at Ankara, June 5, 1926; ratifications exchanged at Angora, July 
18, 1926 
 
CHAPTER I. Frontier Between Turkey and Iraq 
Article 1 
The frontier line between Turkey and Iraq is definitely laid down following 
the line adopted by the Council of the League of Nations at its session on the 29th 
October, 1924, and set forth hereunder: Nevertheless the above mentioned line is 
modified to the south of Alamun and Ashuta so as to include in Turkish territory that 
part of the road which connects these two places and which crosses Iraq territory.  
Article 2 
Subject to the also paragraph of Article 1, the frontier line described in the 
above-mentioned article constitutes the frontier between Turkey and Iraq, and is 
traced on the map annexed to the present treaty. In case of divergence between the 
text and the map the text will prevail.  
Article 3 
A boundary commission shall be appointed to trace on the ground the frontier 
defined in Article 1. This commission shall be composed of two representative 
appointed by the Turkish Government, two representatives appointed jointly by His 
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Majesty‟s Government and the Government of Iraq, and a president, who shall be a 
Swiss national, to be nominated by the President of the Swiss Confederation, if he is 
willing to do so.  
The commission shall meet as soon as possible and in any case within six 
months from the coming into force of the present treaty.  
The decisions of the commission shall be taken by a majority and shall be 
binding on all the high contracting parties.  
The boundary commission shall endeavor in all cases to follow as nearly as 
may be possible the definitions given in the present treaty.  
The expenses of the commission shall be divided equally between Turkey and 
Iraq.  
The states concerned undertake to give assistance to the boundary 
commission, either directly or through local authorities, in every thing that concerns 
the accommodation, labor, material necessary for the accomplishment of its task.  
They undertake further to safeguard the trigonometrical points, signs, posts or 
frontier marks erected by the commission.  
The boundary marks shall be placed so as to be visible from each other. They 
shall be numbered, and their position and their number shall be noted on a 
cartographic document.  
The definitive record of the boundary laid down, and the maps and documents 
attached thereto shall be made out in triplicate, of which two copies shall be 
forwarded to the governments of the two interested states, and the third to the 
Government of the French Republic, in order that authentic copies may be delivered 
to the Powers signatory of the Treaty of Lausanne.  
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Article 4 
The nationality of the inhabitants of the territories ceded to Iraq in virtue of 
the provisions of Article 1 is regulated by Articles 30-36 of the Treaty of Lausanne. 
The high contracting parties agree that the right of option provided for in articles 31 
and 34 of the said treaty may be exercised during a period of twelve months from the 
coming into force of the present treaty.  
Turkey resaves nevertheless her liberty of action in so far us concerns the 
recognition of the option of such of the above-mentioned inhabitants as may opt for 
Turkish nationality.  
Article 5 
Each of the high contracting parties accept as definitive and inviolable the 
frontier line fixed by Article 1 and undertakes to make no attempt to alter it.  
 
CHAPTER II. Neighborly Relations 
Article 6 
The high contracting parties undertake reciprocally to oppose by all means in 
there power any preparations made by one or more armed individuals with the object 
of committing acts of pillage or brigandage in the neighboring frontier zone and to 
prevent them from crossing the frontier.  
Article 7 
Whenever the competent authorities designated in Article 11 learn that 
preparations are being made by one or more armed individuals with the object of 
committing acts of pillage or brigandage in the neighboring frontier zone they shall 
reciprocally inform each other without delay.  
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Article 8 
The competent authorities designated in Article 11 shall reciprocally inform 
each other as quickly as possible of any act of pillage or brigandage which may have 
been perpetrated on their territory. The authorities of the party receiving the notice 
shall make every effort in their power to prevent the authors of such acts from 
crossing the frontier.  
Article 9 
In the event of one or more armed individuals guilty of a crime or 
misdemeanor in the neighboring frontier zone, succeeding in taking refuge in the 
other frontier zone, the authorities of the latter zone are bound to arrest such 
individuals in order to deliver them, in conformity with the law, to the authorities of 
the other party whose nationals they are, together with their booty and their arms.  
Article 10 
The frontier zone to which this chapter of the present treaty shall apply is the 
whole of the frontier which separates Turkey from Iraq and  a zone 75 kilometers in 
width on each side of that frontier.  
Article 11 
The competent authorities to whom the execution of this chapter of the treaty 
is entrusted are the following; 
 For the organization of general cooperation and responsibility for the 
measures to be taken; 
 On the Turkish side : the military commandant of the frontier; 
 On the Iraqi side : the mutes-sarifs of Mosul and Erbil.  
 For the exchange of local information and urgent communications; 
 On the Turkish side : the authorities appointed with consent of the Valis; 
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 On the Iraqi side : the kaima-kams of Zakho, Amadia, Zibar and Rowanduz.  
The Turkish and Iraq Government may, for administrative reasons modify the 
list of their competent authorities, giving notice of such modification either through 
the permanent frontier commission provided for in Article 13 or through the 
diplomatic channel.  
Article 12 
The Turkish and Iraq authorities shall refrain from all correspondence of an 
official or political nature with the chiefs, shaikhs, or other members of tribes which 
are nationals of the other states and which are actually territory of that state.  
They shall not permit in the frontier zone any organization for propaganda 
and meeting directed against either state.  
Article 13 
In order to facilitate the execution of the provisions of the present chapter of 
the treaty, and, in general, the maintenance of good neighborly relations on the 
frontier, there shall be set up a permanent Frontier Commission composed of an 
equal number of officials appointed from time to time for this purpose by the Turkish 
and Iraq Governments respectively. This commission shall meet at least once every 
six months or oftener if circumstances require it.  
It shall be the duty of this commission, which shall meet alternatively in 
Turkey and Iraq to endeavor to settle amicably all questions concerning the 
executions of the provisions of this chapter of the treaty, and any other frontier 
question on which an agreement shall not have been reached between local frontier 
officials concerned.  
The commission shall meet for the first time at Zakho within tow months 
from the coming into force of the present treaty.  
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CHAPTER III. General Provision 
Article 14 
With object of an enlarging the field of common interests between the two 
countries, the Iraq Government shall pay to the Turkish Government for a period of 
25 years from the coming into force of the present treaty 10 percent on all royalties 
which it shall receive : 
(a) From the Turkish Petroleum Company under Article 10 of its concession 
of the 14th March, 1925; 
(b) From such companies persons as may exploit oil under the provisions of 
Article 6 of the above-mentioned concession; 
(c) From such subsidiary companies as may be constituted under the 
provisions of Article 33 of the above-mentioned concession.  
Article 15 
The Turkish and Iraq Governments agree to enter into negotiations as soon as 
possible for the purpose of concluding an extradition treaty in accordance with the 
usages prevailing among friendly states.  
Article 16 
The Iraq Government undertakes not to disturb or molest any persons 
established on its territory on account of their political opinions or conduct in favor 
of Turkey up to the time of the signature of the present treaty, and to grant them full 
and complete amnesty. All sentences pronounced under the above heading shall be 
annulled, and all proceeding already instituted shall be stayed.  
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Article 17 
The present treaty shall come into force on the date of exchange of 
ratifications. Chapter 2 of the present treaty shall remain in force for a period of ten 
years from the date of the coming into force of the present treaty.  
After the termination of a period of two years from the coming into force of the 
present treaty each of the contracting parties shall have the right to denounce this 
chapter in so far as its provisions concerned that party, the denunciation taking effect 
one year after the date on which notice thereof shall have been given.  
Article 18 
The present treaty shall be ratified by each of the high contracting parties, and 
the ratifications shall be exchanged at Ankara as soon as possible. Certified copies of 
the treaty shall be communicated to each of the states signatory of the Treaties of 
Lausanne. In faith whereof the above named plenipotentiaries have signed the 
present treaty and affixed thereto their seals. Done at Angora, the 5th day of June, 
1926, in triplicate.  
                                                                                                      R. C. Lindsay. 
                                                                                                      Dr. T. Rouchdy 
                                                                                                     Nouri Said 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source :  The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1927. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
IRAQI GOVERNMENT ROYALITES AND PAYMENTS TO TURKISH 
BUDGENTS 
 
 Iraqi 
Government 
Royalties 
Calculated % 10 Royalties Payments to Turkish 
Budgets(TL) 
Years Pounds Pounds Turkish Lira Estimated Realized 
1931 401,400 40,140 387,752 2,000,000 3,126,000 
1932 579,400 57,940 429,335 450,000 1,711,682 
1933 742,971 74,297 521,566 518,000 617,469 
1934 1,484,126 148,413 945,388 500,000 682,304 
1935 1,009,400 100,940 622,800 500,000 596,818 
1936 1,049,833 104,983 656,146 800,000 618,212 
1937 1,251,591 125,159 780,993 800,000 714,990 
1938 1,896,533 189,653 1,168,264 800,000 1,065,416 
1939 2,230,146 223,015 1,264,496 1,100,000 919,807 
1940 1,786,941 178,694 934,572 1,000,000 687,261 
1941 1,380,541 138,054 722,021 700,000 619,362 
1942 1,763,061 176,306 922,076 620,000 621,735 
1943 2,209,161 220,916 1,153,181 620,000 808,161 
1944 2,451,644 245,164 1,318,012 750,000 1,033,522 
1945 2,664,147 266,415 - - - 
1946 2,724,092 272,409 1,834,751 1,000,000 1,108,777 
1947 2,705,143 270,514 3,064,925 2,250,000 2,452,932 
1948 2,137,781 213,778 2,432,800 2,450,000 2,430,750 
1949 3,126,316 312,632 3,188,851 2,450,000 1,277,320 
1950 6,781,583 678,158 5,337,105 1,500,000 2,138,066 
1951 15,100,000 1,510,000 11,883,697 2,200,000 3,910,729 
1952 40,600,000 4,060,000 - 6,000,000 - 
1953 58,300,000 5,830,000 - 35,000,000 - 
1954 68,400,000 6,840,000 53,625,588 75,000,000 4,055,490 
1955 73,700,700 7,370,070 0 100,000,000 - 
 
Sources:  Mikdasha, 1966, p.106; Issawi and Yeganeh, 1962, p183; Maliye ve 
Bumruk Bakanlığı(Ministry of Finanace Budget Accounts) Genel Butçe Kanunları, 
Cilt I, Ankara, 1992; Maliye ve Gumruk Bakanlığı (Ministry of Rinance, Realized 
Bdgetary Accounts), Kesin Hesap Kaunuları, 1931-1955, Ankara. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
MAP OF TURKMENLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 128 
 
 
APPENDIX E 
 
MAP OF NO-FLY-ZONE 
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APPENDIX F 
 
MAP OF NORTHERN IRAQ WHERE WAS UNDER CONTORL OF PUK 
AND KDP AFTER 1996 
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APPENDIX G 
 
THE ARTICLE 58 IN THE LAW OF ADMINSTRATION FOR THE STATE 
OF IRAQ FOR THE TRANSNATIONAL PERIOD (TAL) 
 
  
(A) The Iraqi Transitional Government, and especially the Iraqi Property Claims 
Commission and other relevant bodies, shall act expeditiously to take measures to 
remedy the injustice caused by the previous regime‟s practices in altering the 
demographic character of certain regions, including Kirkuk, by deporting and 
expelling individuals from their places of residence, forcing migration in and out of 
the region, settling individuals alien to the region, depriving the inhabitants of work, 
and correcting nationality.  To remedy this injustice, the Iraqi Transitional 
Government shall take the following steps: 
(1)      With regard to residents who were deported, expelled, or who 
emigrated; it shall, in accordance with the statute of the Iraqi 
Property Claims Commission and other measures within the 
law, within a reasonable period of time, restore the residents to 
their homes and property, or, where this is unfeasible, shall 
provide just compensation. 
(2)        With regard to the individuals newly introduced to specific 
regions and territories, it shall act in accordance with Article 
10 of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission statute to ensure 
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that such individuals may be resettled, may receive 
compensation from the state, may receive new land from the 
state near their residence in the governorate from which they 
came, or may receive compensation for the cost of moving to 
such areas. 
(3)        With regard to persons deprived of employment or other 
means of support in order to force migration out of their 
regions and territories, it shall promote new employment 
opportunities in the regions and territories. 
(4)        With regard to nationality correction, it shall repeal all 
relevant decrees and shall permit affected persons the right to 
determine their own national identity and ethnic affiliation free 
from coercion and duress.   
(B)       The previous regime also manipulated and changed administrative 
boundaries for political ends.  The Presidency Council of the Iraqi Transitional 
Government shall make recommendations to the National Assembly on remedying 
these unjust changes in the permanent constitution.  In the event the Presidency 
Council is unable to agree unanimously on a set of recommendations, it shall 
unanimously appoint a neutral arbitrator to examine the issue and make 
recommendations.  In the event the Presidency Council is unable to agree on an 
arbitrator, it shall request the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint a 
distinguished international person to be the arbitrator. 
(C)       The permanent resolution of disputed territories, including Kirkuk, shall be 
deferred until after these measures are completed, a fair and transparent census has 
been conducted and the permanent constitution has been ratified   This resolution 
shall be consistent with the principle of justice, taking into account the will of the 
people of those territories. 
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APPENDIX H 
 
MAP OF PKK CAMPS IN NORTHERN IRAQ 
 
 
 
Sources: Ü mit Özdağ, Türk Ordusu‟nun Kuzey Irak Operasyonları (Turkish Military 
Operations against Norhtern Iraq), (İstanbul: Pegasus, 2008). 
